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CYBERGENICS II.: PRECEDENT AND POLICY VS.
PLAIN MEANING
I. INTRODUCTION
The commencement of a bankruptcy case creates an estate.1 The estate is the
personification of the debtor's property: "a separate and distinct legal entity" constructed by federal law.2 The Bankruptcy Code controls the estate's creation, scope,
dissemination, and cessation. 3 The Code delineates who may act for and in relation to the estate, and it assigns the estate an agent, a representative who will act on
the estate's behalf. 4 The powers and duties of the "estate representative" are comprehensive; they include, for example, the capacity to sue and be sued and the
obligation to act as a fiduciary to the estate and its creditors. 5 In liquidation cases,
a trustee assumes these rights and obligations. 6 In a typical reorganization case,
where an insolvent business seeks to retain its assets and to continue to operate, a
"debtor in possession" fulfills this same role. 7 Bankruptcy law requires the appointed agent, irrespective of his or her identity, to act in the best interests of the
8
bankruptcy estate.
Despite the affirmative "agency" obligations imposed upon bankruptcy trustees and debtors-in-possession, there are routinely disagreements in bankruptcy
proceedings as to whether such an "agent" is truly acting in the best interests of his
principal. 9 Creditors of a bankruptcy estate often allege that a trustee/debtor-in1. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2000).
2. Creditor/Committee Derivative Litigation: Of Textualism and Equitable Powers, BANKR.
L. LETTER., 1, 3 (Nov. 2002) (quoting CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAw OF BANKRUPTCY § 5.1
(1997)) [hereinafter Textualism]. The bankruptcy estate is a creature of the federal Bankruptcy
Code; however, bankruptcy law is not wholly federal. DAvID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY § 13(b) (1993). Principles of federalism "preclude state legislatures from enacting bankruptcy laws,
[however] the Bankruptcy Code often expressly incorporates state law" and commonly references state common-law concepts. Id.
3. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 101, 109, 301, 302, 303 (2000) (controlling commencement); 11
U.S.C. § 541(a)-(b) (identifying what is and is not property of the estate); 11 U.S.C. §§ 503,
506, 507, 510 (2000) (controlling the hierarchy of creditors' claims during a liquidation); 11
U.S.C. §§ 707, 1112, 1208, 1307 (2000) (controlling dismissal).
4. 11 U.S.C. § 323(a) (2000) ("The trustee in a case under this title is the representative of the
estate."); 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2000). A debtor-in-possession has, subject to court imposed
limitations "all the rights ... and shall perform all the functions and duties ... of a trustee
serving in a case under this chapter." Id.
5. 11 U.S.C. § 323(b) ("The trustee in a case under this title has the capacity to sue and be
sued."). See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 704 (2000) (listing the duties of a Chapter 7 trustee). See also 4
BANKR. SERV. L. ED. § 37:79; 2 BAuR . SERv. L. Eo. §§ 15:28, 15:29 (cataloging cases discussing
the role of trustee, or debtor-in-possession, as representative of the estate).
6. 11 U.S.C. § 323(a); see also Susheel Kirpalani, The Importance of Being Plain:A Textual
Response to Cybergenics 11, AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1, 1 n.5 (Nov. 2002) (collecting Bankruptcy
Code provisions that confer authority to act on behalf of the estate to the trustee).
7. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a); BLACK'S LAw DIcioNARY 412 (7th ed. 1999) (defining debtor-inpossession as "a Chapter 11 or 12 debtor that continues to operate its business as a fiduciary to
the bankruptcy estate.").
8. See id.; sources cited supra note 5.
9. Textualism, supra note 2, at 4.
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possession is not pursuing available claims against third parties that, if realized,
are likely to add value to the estate. 10 When such allegations arise, bankruptcy
practice has, for over a century, provided creditors with a "qualified right" to act in
the name of an estate representative who has failed to fulfill his fiduciary obligations to an estate.11 Courts have operated as the "gatekeepers" of this practice,
using broad discretion to adjudge whether the "best interests" of a bankruptcy
estate will in fact be served by allowing another party to step into the shoes of the
estate representative and commence a legal action on behalf of the estate. 12 The
practice has no express statutory basis; however, it was not notably challenged
until late 2002.
On September 20, 2002, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit issued
a panel opinion concluding that a court may not authorize a creditors' committee
to commence an avoidance action in the trustee's name, on behalf of a bankruptcy
estate. 13 The decision shocked the bankruptcy bar and raised such a stir that many
commentators raised it to the status of one of the "top cases of the year." 14 Fur10. Such allegations are anticipated in Chapter 11 reorganization proceedings where a debtorin-possession is likely to encounter conflicts of interest. Kirpalani, supra note 6, at 38 ("In a
quest to maximize [the] value [of the estate], the parties who are best positioned to rehabilitate a
company's operating performance may not be the best parties to investigate the pre-bankruptcy
malfeasance of their colleagues or the board."). For further discussion of potential conflicts of
interest confronting a debtor-in-possession and their potential impact upon that party's abilities
to fulfill its obligations as representative of the estate, see infra notes 206-50 and accompanying
text.
11. Kirpalani, supra note 6, at 38 nn.7-9 (collecting cases dating as early as 1900); Official
Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 569-71 (3rd Cir.
2003) (collecting cases) [hereinafter Cybergenics III].
12. Kirpalani, supra note 6, at 38.
13. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 304 F.3d 316
passim (3d Cir. 2002), vacated, reh'g en banc granted,310 F.3d 785 (3d Cir. 2002) [hereinafter
Cybergenics II]. The Cybergenics' bankruptcy estate appeared before a panel of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals twice on discrete issues. The first appeal, decided in June 2000, is commonly referred to as Cybergenics I, and the second, more controversial opinion at issue in this
Comment, is referred to as Cybergenics II. Cybergenics II was vacated in November of 2002
and reheard by the Third Circuit en banc on February 19, 2003. On May 29, 2003, the Third
Circuit "re-issued" Cybergenics II. For purposes of clarity and consistency the "new Cybergenics
II" will be referred to as Cybergenics III in this Comment. Cybergenics Il came down after this
Comment had already been submitted for publication. It is acknowledged in this Comment, but
it has not been substantively integrated into the arguments raised forthwith.
14. Top Cases-inour humble opinion-of2002, BANKR. CT. DECSIONs, December 24, 2002,
at 1, 1. See also Michael A. Bloom & Joel S. Solomon, CybergenicsI1: Ignoringboth Precedent
and Pragmatism, 11 J. BANrKR. L. & Paac. 417, 417 ("[Cybergenics II] is certain to have a reverberating and detrimental impact... the court ... ignored history, pragmatism, positive experience, and long-standing precedent in favor of unwarranted, literal statutory interpretation.");
Thomas A. Draghi & Mickee M. Hennessy, 'Cybergenics II' Threatens DerivativeStanding of
Creditors' Committees, 229 N.Y.L.J. 11, 11 ("... [Cybergenics II] threatens the vitality of the
well established practice of allowing, under certain circumstances, a creditors' committee to
prosecute fraudulent conveyance actions on behalf of a debtor."); CybergenicsDecisionLeaves
Many Stunned, Scrambling to Find Solution, BANKR. C. DECISIONs, November 19, 2002, at 1, 1
("[Cybergenics II] has reverberated throughout the entire country and left many in the circuit
itself scratching their heads."); Shannon P. Duffy, 3rd Circuit Grants En Banc Review in
Cybergenics Case, at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id 1036630464156 (Nov. 21, 2002)
("Bankruptcy lawyers everywhere are breathing a sigh of relief now that the 3rd U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals has vacated [Cybergenics II].").
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thermore, within two months, the Second Circuit came down with a squarely contrary decision, reaffirming the validity of the practice within the Second Circuit
and failing to even acknowledge recent events in the Third Circuit. 15 The resulting circuit split "pit[] two powerhouse bankruptcy jurisdictions against one another in a battle" of bankruptcy law, policy and statutory construction. 16 The Third
Circuit, in reaching its conclusion, adopted a "plain meaning" interpretation of the
Bankruptcy Code, purporting to follow the recent directive of the Supreme Court
towards strict construction of the Bankruptcy Code. 17 The court found that the
express language of the Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee, and only the trustee,
the authority to bring avoidance actions on behalf of the bankruptcy estate. 18 In
contrast, the Second Circuit employed a "best interest of the estate" approach,
asserting that courts have the authority to actualize the broad policies and purposes
of the Bankruptcy Code. 19 Accordingly, a court may authorize creditors to pursue
avoidance actions in the trustee's name, for the benefit of the estate, when such a
suit is "necessary and beneficial" to the "fair and efficient" resolution of bank20
ruptcy proceedings.
The Third Circuit panel premised CybergenicsII upon HartfordUnderwriters
21
Insurance Co. v. Union PlantersBank, issued by the Supreme Court in 2000.22
Hartford Underwritersespoused a "plain meaning approach" to the Bankruptcy
Code, interpreting the language "the trustee may" to be an exclusive grant of
power.23 In this case, an individual creditor had unilaterally commenced an action
seeking direct compensation for services that it performed for the benefit of a bankruptcy estate. 24 The Supreme Court foreclosed this action because the right to
pursue administrative claims is specifically conferred to the trustee and to no other
party; the language the trustee may did not imply that the trustee and any other
party in interestmay. 25 The Court found that an exclusive grant of authority could
not be implicitly extended to any party other than the grantee. 26 In CybergenicsII,
the Third Circuit applied the reasoning of HartfordUnderwritersto the provisions
of the Code that grant a bankruptcy trustee the power to commence adversarial
proceedings, known as the trustee's "strong arm" powers. 27 These provisions all
begin with the language "the trustee may."28 Accordingly, the court concluded
15. Banque Nationale de Paris v. Murad (In re Housecraft Indus. USA, Inc.) 310 E3d 64 (2d
Cir. 2002) [hereinafter Housecraft]. See also infra Part VI (B) (discussing Housecraft).
16. In Housecraft, Second Circuit Stands Its Groundon Derivative FraudulentTransferActions in Spite of ControversialThird Circuit Cybergenics II Holding, Com. ADVISOR (Hale and
Dorr LLP), December 2002, at 1 [hereinafter Hale and Doff].
17. Cybergenics H, 304 F.3d at 319 (3d Cir. 2002); see also Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v.
Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1 (2000).
18. Cybergenics II, 304 F3d at 319. In this context the concept of the "trustee" includes
debtors-in-possession. See 1I U.S.C. § 1107(a).
19. Housecraft, 310 F.3d at 70.
20. Id.
21. 530 U.S. 1 (2000).

22. Cybergenics II, 304 F3d at 319.
23. See generally Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1 (2000).
See also infra Part II.

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. at 3-6.
Id.at 6.
Id.
Cybergenics II, 304 F.3d at 319.
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) (2000).
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that there is no implicit statutory authority for any other party in interest to exer29
cise these powers.
In Cybergenics III, the Third Circuit sitting en banc, ultimately determined
that Hartford Underwriters should be narrowly construed, appropriately considered in circumstances where a nontrustee tries "unilaterally to circumvent the
Code's remedialscheme."'30 The appellate court found that, in contrast, Cybergenics
III concerned "a bankruptcy court's equitable power to craft a remedy when the
Code's envisioned scheme breaks down.' 3 1 The court determined that the two
settings were not analogous. 32 Therefore, the Supreme Court's construction of the
language "the trustee may" was inapposite. 33 However, Judge Fuentes, the author
of Cybergenics II and the Cybergenics III dissent, has argued that the Supreme
Court's strict construction of language "the trustee may" in HartfordUnderwriters
forecloses any other interpretation of that plain statutory language irrespective of
the factual setting at hand, because, "when the language of a statute is plain .. .the
sole function of the courts-at least where the disposition required by the text is
'34
not absurd-is to enforce it according to its terms."
The differences between Cybergenics II and II call attention to an ideological
tension between two competing styles of Bankruptcy Code construction: one that
allows the text to be construed in order to give effect to the broad purposes and
policies of bankruptcy, as opposed to one that adheres to a strict reading of the text,
giving effect to the plain meaning of the words as set forth by Congress. This
Comment explores the competing approaches. Part II looks at Hartford Underwriters, the Supreme Court opinion that the CybergenicsII court found to be controlling upon the issue of derivative standing 35 and which Housecraft chose not to
even mention. 36 Parts III and IV examine the evolution of Cybergenics 11: how
the issue came before the Third Circuit, the court's disposition of the arguments,
and the court's controversial conclusion. Part V explores the immediate effect of
the Cybergenics11 opinion both upon the case at bar and upon other cases pending
at the time. Part VI looks at the theoretical split "in action," reviewing the issue's
disposition in a sampling of bankruptcy, district and appellate courts.
Finally, Part VII concludes that in light of the statutory approach espoused by
the Supreme Court in Hartford Underwriters,the controversial and arguably impractical result of the Cybergenics 11 decision is correct. And, although there are
many well reasoned, principled arguments for allowing the practice of derivative
creditor avoidance actions, none of them can be effectively reconciled with the
strict constructionist mandate of Hartford Underwriters. The arguments for distinguishing Hartford Underwriters, this Comment concludes, are, in fact, arguments that "plain meaning" statutory construction is inapt for bankruptcy jurisprudence. Opponents of Cybergenics H are ultimately advocating that, despite the
Supreme Court's edict in Hartford Underwriters, courts may subjectively reject
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Cybergenics II, 304 F.3d at 319.
Cybergenics I, 330 E3d 548, 552-53 (3d Cir. 2003) (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
See generally id.
See generally id.
Id. at 580-82 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Cybergenics II, 304 E3d at 319.
See generally Housecraft, 310 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2002).
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"plain meaning" statutory construction depending upon the type of bankruptcy
37
proceeding at hand.
II. THE HARTFORD UNDERWRITERS DECISION
38
This
Hartford Underwriterswas decided in 2000 by a unanimous Court.
39
case, often referred to as "Hen House," arose out of the bankruptcy proceeding
of Hen House Interstate, Inc. 40 Hen House initially filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in September 1991, and, operating as a
debtor-in-possession, continued to control its assets and business for approximately
two and a half years. 4 1 The reorganization was not successful; the case was conveted to a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding and a trustee was appointed in January 1993.42 Unaware of any bankruptcy proceedings, Hartford Underwriters Insurance Co. unwittingly provided Hen House with workers' compensation insurance during its attempted reorganization, and, at the time liquidation commenced,
Hen House owed Hartford more than fifty thousand dollars in unpaid insurance
premiums. 43 Hartford attempted to recover the expense by charging the premiums
to Union Bank, Hen House's primary secured creditor.44 Hen House attempted to
gain priority over Union Bank's secured claims by filing an "Application for Allowance of Administrative Expense," pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 503 and a "Charge
45
Against Collateral," pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(c).
Section 503 allows parties who incur expenses while trying to preserve or
maintain the value of an estate in bankruptcy to petition for the recovery of these
"administrative expenses." 46 These administrative claims ordinarily have priority
over pre-bankruptcy petition unsecured claims.47 Section 506 expands the recovery allowed under section 503 by giving administrative claims, in limited circumstances, priority over secured claims as well. 48 It provides in pertinent part: "The
trustee may recover from property securing an allowed secured claim the reasonable, necessary costs and expenses of preserving, or disposing of, such property to
the extent of any benefit to the holder of such claim." 49 Hartford alleged that its
provision of insurance had served to preserve the value of Union Bank's collateral,
and, accordingly, was trying to recover its administrative expenses from the value
of Union's collateral. 50 The Court assumed for the purposes of its decision that

37. Hartford Underwriterswas not the first Supreme Court decision to espouse a "plain
meaning" approach to Bankruptcy Code construction. See, e.g., United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc. 489 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1989) ("As long as the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent, there generally is no need for a court to inquire beyond the plain language of the statute.").
38. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1,2 (2000).
39. Bloom & Solomon, supra note 14, at 419 n.16.
40. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v.Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. at 3.
41. Id. at 3-4.
42. Id. at 4.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See id. at 4. These provisions operate to alter the priority scheme of claims in bankruptcy.
46. 11 U.S.C. § 503(a)-(b)(1)(A) (2000), (providing that an entity may recover "the actual,
necessary costs and expenses," other than claims allowed under section 502(f).").
47. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. at 4-5 (citing 11 U.S.C.
§§ 507(a)(1), 726(a)(1), 1129(a)(9)(A) (2000)).
48. Id. at 5.
49. 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) (emphasis added).
50. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v.Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. at 3-4.
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workers' compensation insurance constituted a "benefit" to Union's security interest by allowing the continued operation of Hen House's business and thereby preserving the value of Union's collateral. 5 1 The only issue the Court contemplated
was whether an administrative claimant was unilaterally empowered by the Bank52
ruptcy Code to seek recovery under section 506(c).
Focusing intently on the plain language of the statute, specifically the phrase
"the trustee may," the Court found that only the trustee was empowered to invoke
section 506(c). 53 The Court supported its conclusion that Congress intended sec54
tion 506 to be an exclusive conveyance of authority with textual arguments.
First, the express statutory language authorized a specific action and empowered a
particular party to take that action; and, second, the particular party named, the
trustee, is one with very unique rights and responsibilities in the bankruptcy process.55 The Court contrasted the specificity of section 506(c) with the broad phrasing
of recovery powers granted in other sections of the Bankruptcy Code. 56 And, the
Court rejected the argument that the lack of explicit exclusionary language, such
as "only the trustee may" could sensibly be interpreted as a reason to ignore that
57
specificity.
After reviewing the text-based arguments, the Court turned to Hartford's arguments that pre-Code practice and policy considerations justified an expanded
reading of the language "the trustee may."58 Discounting early precedents, the
Court asserted that
[although] pre-Code practice informs our understanding of the language of the
Code, it cannot overcome that language. It is a tool of construction, not an
extratextual supplement. We have applied it to the construction of provisions
which were subject to interpretation, or contained ambiguity in the text. [Wihere
the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code's text is itself clear ... its operation is
unimpeded by contrary... prior practice. In this case, we think the language of
59
the Code leaves no room for clarification by pre-Code practice.
Policy considerations, such as a lack of trustee incentive to pursue payment, were
discounted as well.60 The Court found the trustee was bound to seek recovery
whenever its fiduciary duties required him to do so and that allowing others an
independent right to seek recovery would interfere with the trustee's abilities to
manage the estate, possibly impairing the coordination of the proceedings as a
whole. 61 Ultimately, the Court did not want "to assess the relative merits of differ51. Id. at 5-6.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 6. The Court noted that "[d]ebtors-in-possession may also use the section, as they
are expressly given the rights and powers of a trustee by 11 U.S.C. § 1107." Id. at 6 n.3.
54. Id. at 6-7.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 7 (discussing sections 502(a) and 503(b)(4) which provide claims for relief without
naming specific parties empowered to act on them).
57. Id. at 8 (discussing sections of the Code granting authority to the trustee without explicit
exclusion of other parties in interest where it is, nonetheless, clear that the authority is exclusive
to the trustee).
58. Id. at 10-13.
59. Id. at 10-11 (alterations in original) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
60. Id. at 11-13.
61. Id. at 13.

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:2

62

ent approaches to various bankruptcy problems."
The Hartford Underwriters
decision resulted from the "natural reading of the text," and avowed that "[a]chieving
63
a better policy outcome.., is a task for Congress, not the courts."
I[.THE EVOLUTION OF CYBERGENICS II
In 1985, Scott Chinery established L & S Research Corporation and operating
under the brand name "Cybergenics," marketed nutritional food supplements for
body-building and weight loss programs. 64 Lincolnshire Management, Inc. reached
a leveraged buyout agreement with Chinery and L & S in 1994 and founded
66
65
Cybergenics Corporation in order to acquire the majority of L & S's assets.
Cybergenics Corporation faltered within two years and filed a voluntary petition
for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. 67 Cybergenics operated as a
68
debtor-in-possession and, as is usual, a bankruptcy trustee was not appointed.
Seven of Cybergenics' unsecured creditors were appointed to the Committee of
Unsecured Creditors. 69 In 1997, despite having filed a Chapter 11 petition, the
Cybergenics estate opted to auction all its assets rather than reorganize. 70 After a
court supervised auction of all its assets to a third party for 2.65 million dollars,
Cybergenics moved to dismiss the bankruptcy case. 7 1 The Committee objected,
contending that transactions relating to Lincolnshire's leveraged buyout could give
rise to viable fraudulent transfer claims. 72 Cybergenics declined to pursue any
such claims, and the Committee sought leave of the bankruptcy court to pursue a
fraudulent transfer action on behalf of the debtor-in-possession. 73 The bankruptcy
court authorized derivative standing and allowed the Committee to commence pro74
ceedings in the name of debtor-in-possession and on behalf of the estate.
In 1998, the Committee filed a complaint in the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey, "seeking to avoid allegedly fraudulent transfers
made by and liabilities incurred by Cybergenics in connection with the leveraged
buyout and post-buyout transactions and to have the value of the avoided transactions returned to the bankruptcy estate. ' 75 On defendants' 76 motion, the district
court dismissed the proceeding, holding that "the fraudulent transfer claims were
62. Id.
63. id. at 13-14.
64. Cybergenics II, 304 F3d 316, 319 (3d Cir. 2002).
65. Id. Lincolnshire, in fact, established Cybergenics Acquisition, Inc. and this entity later
became Cybergenics Corporation. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 320.
68. Id.A trustee is rarely appointed in Chapter 11 cases. See DAVID G. EPsTEIN ET AL., supra
note 2, at § 10-8.
69. Cybergenics II, 304 F.3d at 320.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. ld.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. There were three groups of defendants in Cybergenics II: the lenders who were involved
in financing the leveraged buyout; Lincolnshire Management-the purchaser of L & S; and
Chinery. Id. at 319-20. One count was brought under 11 U.S.C. § 544 against each group and all
three filed motions to dismiss. Id. at 319.
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assets of the debtor, and that because the 1996 bankruptcy asset sale sold off all of
Cybergenics's assets, the claims were no longer property of the bankruptcy estate
77
and the Committee could not raise them on the estate's behalf."
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the New Jersey District Court's
first dismissal of the avoidance proceeding in September 2000.78 The Third Circuit held that state law deemed the fraudulent transfer claims to be the property of
the creditor, and, therefore, the claims could not have been sold as part of the
bankruptcy asset sale in 1996. 79 The court found that although debtors-in-possession are "endowed" with the responsibility of "bring[ing] certain claims on behalf
of, and for the benefit of, all creditors," this power in no way "shift[s] ownership
' ' 80
On remand,
of the fraudulent transfer action to the debtor[-]in[-]possession.
the defendants again moved for dismissal of the avoidance proceeding; this time
they argued "that under a plain reading of [section] 544(b) and the reasoning of
Hartford Underwriters, 8 1 the Committee lacked standing to bring the fraudulent
82
transfer action because only a trustee or debtor-in-possession has such standing."
The District Court agreed and dismissed the avoidance proceeding for the second
time. 83 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this dismissal. 84 The court
determined that the "rather well established practice" of permitting creditors and
creditors' committees to initiate derivative avoidance actions could not survive the
85
Supreme Court's reasoning in Hartford Underwriters.
The limited holding of HartfordUnderwritersforeclosed the independent right
of an administrative claimant to seek recovery under the authority of 11 U.S.C. §
506(c). 86 In footnote 5 of the opinion, the Court specifically declined to address
77. Id. at 320.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery (In re Cybergenics
Corp.), 226 F.3d 237, 244 (3d Cir. 2000) [hereinafter Cybergenics I]. The court analyzed the
fraudulent transfer claims and determined that Cybergenics did not "own" them as assets per se.
Id. at 245. The court opined:
The fact that section 544(b) authorizes a debtor[-]in[-]possession, such as Cybergenics,
to avoid a transfer using a creditor's fraudulent transfer action does not mean that the
fraudulent transfer action is actually an asset of the debtor[-]in[-]possession, nor should
it be confused with the separate authority of a trustee or debtor[-]in[-]possession to
pursue the prepetition debtor's causes of action that become property of the estate
upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Rather, it simply enables a debtor[-]in[]possession to carry out its trustee-related duties. . . . This attribute is no more an
asset of Cybergenics as debtor[-]in[-]possession than it would be a personal asset of a
trustee, had one been appointed in this case. Much like a public official has certain
powers upon taking office as a means to carry out the functions bestowed by virtue of
the office or public trust, the debtor[-Iin[-]possession is similarly endowed to bring
certain claims on behalf of, and for the benefit of, all creditors.
Id. at 243-44 (internal citations omitted).
81. In Hartford Underwriters,the United States Supreme Court interpreted the plain meaning of the language "the trustee may" as it appears in section 506(c) of the Bankruptcy Code; the
case is discussed supra Part U.
82. Cybergenics II, 304 F.3d at 321.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 319.
85. Id.
86. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. at 14.

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:2

"the practice of some courts of allowing creditors or creditors' committees a derivative right to bring avoidance actions when the trustee refuses to do so, even
though the applicable Code provisions... mention only the trustee. ' 87 The Third
Circuit was the first circuit to apply the reasoning of HartfordUnderwritersto the
practice of court sanctioned derivative standing and to find, accordingly, that the
practice was now untenable. 88 In Cybergenics II, the Creditors' Committee had
petitioned the bankruptcy court for the right to utilize 11 U.S.C. § 544, the Code
provision that gives the trustee, or debtor-in-possession, the power to avoid fraudulent transfers. 89 Section 544 reads in pertinent part: "the trustee may avoid any
transfer of an interest of the debtor in property or any obligation incurred by the
debtor that is voidable under applicable law by a creditor holding an unsecured
claim." 90
The bankruptcy court, drawing upon pre- and post-Hartford Underwriter's
bankruptcy practice, had determined that the Creditors' Committee may raise a
fraudulent transfer claim in the trustee's name, under section 544, if: "1) it presented colorable fraudulent transfer claims; 2) Cybergenics refused to bring the
claims; and 3) Cybergenics's refusal was unjustified in relation to its duty as a
debtor-in-possession to maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate for the creditors." 91 Finding that these criteria had been satisfied, the bankruptcy court had
92
granted the Committee permission to proceed with the suit.
In contrast, the district court and then the Third Circuit Panel decided that, in
light of Hartford Underwriters,prior practice and precedent were no longer controlling. 9 3 Both courts focused intently on the statutory language, specifically the
phrase "the trustee may," as set forth in section 544.94 Ultimately, they concluded
that the Supreme Court's construction of the identical language in section 506
applied "with equal force" to section 544.95 The Third Circuit could find no "principled basis" for translating the phrase "the trustee may" differently at different
places in the Code. 9 6 Stressing the need for uniformity in the application of statutory sections that are similar in purpose and content, the court indicated that the
presumption of a common meaning could only be overcome with significant evidence that the words were employed in the different sections with different intent.97 Sections 506 and 544 of the Bankruptcy Code, the court concluded, use the
words "the trustee may" in similar purpose and context: as "a description of the
powers of the trustee and the avenues for relief available under the Code for the
87. Id. at 13 n.5. See discussion of "footnote five" infra Part IV.C.
88. Cybergenics II, 304 F.3d at 319, 322-23. Earlier in the year, the Third Circuit acknowledged, in dicta, "that after Hartford Underwriters,'there is some doubt as to whether a creditor
can act derivatively in the debtor's stead to invoke section 544(b)."' Id. at 322 n.8 (quoting In re
PWS Holding Corp., 303 F.3d 308 (3d Cir. 2002)). Other courts have questioned the validity of
derivative standing under this provision since the Hartford Underwriters decision; however,
they have reaffirmed the practice. Id. at 323 (citing In re Commodore Int'l Ltd., 262 F.3d 96,

100 (2d Cir. 2001)).
89. Id. at 322.
90. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) (1993).

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Cybergenics II, 304 F.3d at 323.
Id.
Id at 330-31.
Id. at 324.
Id.
Id. at 324-25.
Id. at 325.
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benefit of the creditors and the estate." 98 The court could not find any provision in
the Code that expressly extended the authority to utilize section 544 to anyone
other than the trustee. 99 In view of the Supreme Court's "plain meaning" reading
of the Bankruptcy Code in Hartford Underwriters,the circuit court did not feel it
could deem section 544 to be a broad conveyance of power. 100
IV THE ARGUMENTS RAISED IN CYBERGENICS II
A. PlainLanguage Statutory Construction
Since HartfordUnderwriterscame down, several jurisdictions have questioned
the continued legitimacy of derivative creditor standing. 10 1 In 2002, a Louisiana
bankruptcy court assessed the potential impact of Hartford Underwriters's"plain
meaning" Bankruptcy Code construction. 102 Cybergenics II cites to In re Blount
as support for the proposition that Hartford Underwritershas cast doubt upon the
validity of derivative creditor standing. 10 3 The Blount court commented:
Although [Hartford Underwriters] specifically dealt with only the question
of whether a creditor has independent standing to use the collateral surcharge
provisions of [section] 506(c), the language and rationale of the opinion seemingly have application to all provisions of the Bankruptcy Code wherein the party
authorized to seek recovery (to act) is limited to the trustee. Indeed, the [Hartford Underwriters]rationale has been expanded beyond the confines of [section]
506(c). 104
Further, the Blount court inferred from the dicta of HartfordUnderwritersthat the
Supreme Court views "'derivative standing' as a judicial concoction or equitable
gloss upon the Code... designed to get around [its] plain language." 105 In light of
this, the Blount court surveyed the operation of the language "the trustee may"
throughout the Bankruptcy Code, paying particular attention to the avoidance provisions named in footnote five of the Hartford Underwritersopinion. 106 The court
acknowledged that acceptance of the Hartford Underwriters "rationale" would
require that "standing to recover property transferred or concealed by the debtor,
'
as established by these Code provisions, is limited solely to 'the trustee."' 107
98. Id.
99. Id. In specific, the Cybergenics II court cited to the Fifth Circuit's In re LouisianaWorld
Exposition, Inc., 832 F.2d 1391, 1397 (5th Cir. 1988) and the Second Circuit's In re STN Enterprises, 779 F.2d 901, 904 (2d Cir. 1985). Id. In both of these cases, the circuit courts acknowledged the lack of clear statutory authority but, nonetheless, validated the practice of derivative
standing: holding that a creditor or creditors' committee may, upon meeting certain conditions
and with bankruptcy court approval, initiate adversary proceedings in Chapter 11 cases. Id. at
322-23, 325.
100. Id. at 325.

101. Id. at 328.
102. In re Blount, 276 B.R. 753, 759-64 (Bankr. M.D. La. 2002).

103. Cybergenics II, 304 F.3d at 328.
104, Id. (quoting In re Blount, 276 B.R. at 760).
105. In re Blount, 276 B.R. at 760.
106. Id. See 11 U.S.C. § 545 (2000) ("The trustee may avoid ..

(2000) ("The trustee may avoid ..

"); 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)

"); 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (2000) ("rhe trustee may avoid.

. ."); 11 . U.S.C. § 548(b) (2000) ("The trustee of a partnership debtor may avoid .... "); 11
U.S.C. § 549(a) (2000) ("The trustee may avoid .... "). See also Kirpalani, supra note 6, at 1.

107. In re Blount, 276 B.R. at 760.
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The Cybergenics II court's reliance on Blount, however, may have been misplaced, because the Blount court ultimately concluded that Hartford Underwriters
did not foreclose derivative creditor standing in bankruptcy proceedings.1 08 Blount
distinguished HartfordUnderwritersby construing it narrowly, finding that it only
controls in the limited scenario where a creditor asserts an independent right to act
for its own benefit, without court authorization.109 Because the case at bar did not
fit within that express purview, the court chose not to apply the Hartford Underwriters "rationale."1 10 Instead, the Blount court found the authority for derivative
standing in Bankruptcy Code section 503(b)(3)(B). 111 This Code provision grants
creditors who have, with court approval, recovered property "transferred or concealed by the debtor," the right to recoup administrative expenses associated with
that recovery. 112 Although the language seems to imply that creditors have a right
to act to recover property, because that is the only way that they would incur administrative expenses associated with recovery, the language is not an express grant
113
Its
of any rights or powers other than the recovery of administrative expenses.
"plain meaning" is that creditors who recover estate property, however that may
be, shall be allowed to recover administrative expenses; any other construction
requires assumptions regarding Congressional intent and implied powers. 114 Despite this, the Blount court interpreted section 503(b)(3)(B) as a substantive textual
basis for courts to "confer derivative standing upon creditors to pursue actions that
will lead to the recovery of property transferred or concealed by the debtor, for the
115
benefit of the estate."
Hartford Underwriters, according to the Louisiana bankruptcy court, mandates that a creditor has no independent authority to bring an avoidance action on
behalf of the debtor whether the action was for the creditor's own benefit or for the
benefit of the estate. 116 The Blount court held, however, that under the authority
of section 503(b)(3)(B), a creditor may, with court approval,recover property trans108. See Cybergenics II, 304 F.3d at 328-29; cf In re Blount, 276 B.R. at 760-61.
109. See In re Blount, 276 B.R. at 760-62.
110. See id. Cybergenics III premised its holding on the same type of distinction, concluding
that the type of right at issue and the manner in which it is asserted control the applicability of
Hartford Underwriters. See Cybergenics III, 330 F.3d 548, 552-53 (3d Cir. 2003).
111. In re Blount, 276 B.R. at 760-61. Section 503 provides recovery of administrative
expenses including "the actual, necessary expenses ...incurred by... a creditor that recovers,
after the court's approval, for the benefit of the estate any property transferred or concealed by
the debtor .. " 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(B) (2000).
112. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(B).
113. See id.
114. See id.; see also Cybergenics III, 330 F.3d at 559-67. Cybergenics III concluded that
sections 1109(b), 1103(c)(5), and 506(b)(3)(B) could be read together to reveal "the role Congress intended creditors' committees to play in the reorganization process." Id.
115. In re Blount, 276 B.R. at 761. The Blount court concluded that section 503(b)(3)(B) was
a textual basis for derivative standing and that the language of the provision set forth criteria that
must be satisfied before derivative standing may be granted:
[F]irst, that the status of the party seeking administrative expense recovery be a creditor of the debtor. Second, the statute requires that the creditor be one, "that recovers
...
any property transferred or concealed by the debtor." Third, the statute commands
that the recovery of property transferred or concealed by the debtor be "for the benefit
of the estate." The statute also dictates a fourth requirement, court approval.
Id. at 759 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(B)).
116. Id. at 760.
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ferred or concealed by the debtorfor the benefit of the estate. 117 This understanding of section 503(b)(4)(B), the court reasoned, was the only understanding that
would give it any effect. 118 A creditor who "recovers" is entitled to seek administrative expenses; however, a creditor "who cannot act cannot recover."119 The
Blount court asserts, perhaps erroneously, that derivative creditor standing is a
creditor's only vehicle to "act" under the Code and that without it section
503(b)(3)(B) will be rendered meaningless. 120 In order to give meaning to section
503, the court rejects the "plain meaning" statutory construction approach espoused
by the Supreme Court in Hartford Underwritersin favor of court-created implicit
powers. The court rejects, in other words, the very Hartford Underwriters"rationale" it had already acknowledged as "law" in the same opinion.
Cybergenics IHalso considered the Fifth Circuit's treatment of Hartford Underwriters.121 In re Stangel122 denies a non-trustee the power to avoid a federal
tax lien under Bankruptcy Code section 545(2) because that provision conveys
that power expressly to the trustee and only the trustee. 12 3 Section 545 reads in
pertinent part: "[t]he trustee may avoid the fixing of a statutory lien on property of
the debtor .... "124 The Stangel court noted that this section codified the trustee's
ability, and only the trustee's ability, to avoid certain liens and refused to find the
provision available to any other parties no matter how viable their interests might
be. 125 The Stangel court concluded that Hartford Underwritersdemands strict
statutory construction of the Bankruptcy Code: requiring "[reliance] principally
on the clear statement in the statute, assisted by the overall context of the Bankruptcy Code." 126 Because section 545(2) conveys a specific power to a specific
party, namely the trustee, the court found that Hartford Underwriters forecloses
the judicial expansion of that power to other parties in interest. 127 Accordingly,
117. Id. at 760-61.
118. Id. at 760. This proposition, that the court had authority to "grant derivative standing to
pursue recovery of such property (transferred or concealed)[,] ... seem[ed] self evident..." to
the Blount court. Id. at 761.
119. Id. at 760-61 (emphasis added).
120. Id. at 761. In his Cybergenics III dissent, Judge Fuentes rebuts the argument that section
503(b)(3)(B) is otherwise useless. 330 .3d 548,583-84 (arguing that "the most prevalent use of
* . . this provision[] is to compensate individual creditors who object to discharge and then
successfully locate and bring into the estate assets that had been transferred or concealed by the
debtor.").
121. Cybergenics II, 304 F.3d 316, 329 (3d Cir. 2002).
122. In re Stangel, 219 F.3d 498 (5th Cir. 2000).
123. Id. at 500.
124. 11 U.S.C. § 545 (2000).
125. In re Stangel, 219 E3d at 500.
126. Id. at 501. The Stangel court noted that the Supreme Court had refused to find an
implicit conveyance of authority in section 506. Id. Hartford Underwritersasserts that "' [this
theory-that the expression of one thing indicates the inclusion of others unless exclusion is
made explicit-is contrary to common sense and common usage. Many provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that do not contain an express exclusion cannot sensibly be read to extend to all
parties in interest."' Id. (quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 530
U.S. 1, 8 (2000)).
127. Id. The Stangel court noted that "[a]lthough § 506(c) is a different provision than the
one at issue here, and a Chapter 11 case is different from a Chapter 13 case, the [Supreme]
Court's mode of reasoning is fully applicable" because Hartford Underwritersinvolved a Code
provision "that stated that trustees had certain powers, and ... rejected interpretations that extended those powers to other parties in interest." Id.
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the court refused to grant a Chapter 13 debtor permission to pursue an avoidance
128
action.
In the Fifth Circuit, pre-HartfordUnderwriterscase law already favored "plain
130
129
In 1997, in In re Hamilton,
meaning" construction of the Bankruptcy Code.
the Fifth Circuit had refused "to allow [a] Chapter 13 debtor[] to exercise [the]
strong-arm powers reserved for Chapter 13 trustees." 131 The Hamilton court declined to extend the statutory powers of a trustee to a non-trustee when it could
find no express textual basis for doing so. 132 Hamilton ultimately gave the debtor
at issue the authority to avoid a prior foreclosure sale under section 522(h) because
this Code provision expressly grants avoidance rights to a Chapter 13 debtor who
133
has satisfied certain criteria.
The reasoning in Stangel and Hamilton is analogous to the reasoning in Hartford Underwriters because in all three cases a non-trustee attempted to assert an
independent right to exercise the avoidance powers explicitly available to the trustee
under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 134 Cybergenics II is also analogous
to these cases in the sense that it involves a non-trustee attempting to exercise
avoidance powers. 135 However, because the non-trustee party seeking permission
to act in Cybergenicslwas the Creditors' Committee (and not a Chapter 13 debtor),
Cybergenics11 remains subject to the section 503 arguments raised in In re Blount
in a way that Stangel and Hamilton do not. 136 Section 503(b)(3)(B)-as it relates
only to the potential rights of creditors-isnot a potential source of implicit rights
for Chapter 13 debtors.
Cybergenics If also examines In re McLeroy, 137 a Texas District Court decision influenced by Hartford Underwriters.138 In In re McLeroy, the court refused
to allow a Chapter 7 debtor to use section 548 because that section conveys power
exclusively to the trustee. 139 The purpose of section 548, indicated by the plain
language of the Code and also by the Congressional Record, is to limit a bank128. Id. Chapter 13 debtors are distinct from debtors-in-possession, as "mere" debtors they
do not have the authority to invoke the rights and powers of a trustee. See 11 U.S.C. § 1107
(2000).
129. In re Stangel, 219 F.3d at 500-01 ("Two cases.., lead us to conclude that Stangel lacks
standing to pursue his avoidance motion.").
130. 125 F.3d 292 (5th Cit. 1997).
131. In re Stangel, 219 F3d at 500-01 (quoting In re Hamilton, 125 F.3d at 296).
132. Id. The Hamilton court explicitly rejected the suggestion that section 1303, which is
frequently referred to a "catch all" provision could serve as a basis of statutory authority for the
court to grant derivative power. In re Hamilton, 125 F.3d at 296.
133. In re Stangel, 219 F3d at 501. Section 522(h) reads in pertinent part: "The debtormay
avoid a transfer of property of the debtor or recover a setoff to the extent that the debtor could
have exempted such property under subsection (g)(1) of this section if the trustee had avoided
such transfer, if... 11 U.S.C. § 522(h) (2000) (emphasis added).
134. See generallyIn re Stangel, 219 F.3d 498 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Hamilton, 125 F.3d 292
(5th Cir. 1997).
135. See generally Cybergenics II, 304 F.3d 316 (3d Cir. 2002).
136. See supra notes 100-119 and accompanying text for discussion of the arguments raised
in In re Blount.
137. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. McLeroy (In re McLeroy) 250 B.R. 872 (N.D. Tex. 2000)
[hereinafter In re McLeroy].
138. Cybergenics HI,304 F.3d at 329.
139. In re McLeroy, 250 B.R. at 880-81. Section 548 as amended by the Religious Liberty
and Charitable Donation Protection Act of 1998 ("RLCDPA") limits the trustee in attempting to
set aside charitable donations as fraudulent conveyances. Id. at 881. Section 548(a) reads in
pertinent part:
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ruptcy trustee's authority to set aside charitable donations under the fraudulent
transfer provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 140 Under section 523(a)(8), a debtor
who is attempting to set aside educational loan indebtedness through bankruptcy
must establish that paying the debt would amount to "undue hardship." 14 1 The
establishment of undue hardship requires the debtor to account for all his or her
"appropriate expenses" and income so that the court may assess the debtor's liquidity. 142 In this case, a debtor who was attempting to set aside educational loan
indebtedness was trying to automatically qualify her tithing as an appropriate expense for purposes of the section 523(a)(8) undue hardship test. 143 She argued
that the limitation upon the trustee's authority to set aside tithing under section 548
implied a general proposition that tithing was an "appropriate expense" under the
Bankruptcy Code. 144 The court found that section 548 "only addresses the avoidance powers of the bankruptcy trustee. [There is] no mention of conferring any
additional rights upon any other party... ?,145 The court refused to expand the
intention of section 548 beyond it plain meaning, because under Hartford Underwriters "[w]here a statute ...names the parties granted [the] right to invoke its
146
provisions.... such parties only may act."'
The McLeroy court's refusal to expand the meaning of one section in order to
supplement the value of another stands in relative contrast to the section 503 analysis
set forth in the Blount opinion. 147 The "undue hardship" requirement of section
523(a)(8) is not substantively defined in the Code. 14 8 Courts have given effect to
the requirement through a balancing test: cataloguing the debtor's appropriate expenses and weighing them against income. 149 The McLeroy court refused to find
that the recognition of tithes as a legitimate expense in one Code provision was a
basis for the automatic recognition of it as such in another context. 150 The court
found that it was the "better reasoned and more consistent application of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code," to avoid judicially expanding the consequences of
the statute. 151 The decision of the Blount court to use the rights defined in one
(1)
The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property, or any
obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within one year
before the date of the filing ....
(2) A transfer of a charitable contribution to a qualified religious or charitable entity
or organization shall not be considered to be a transfer covered under paragraph (1).

11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (2000). In this case, the debtor was arguing that RLCDPA amendments to
the Bankruptcy Code conferred a debtor with the automatic right to classify tithing as an "appropriate" expenditure under section 523(a)(8). In re McLeroy, 250 B.R. at 879-80.
140. In re McLeroy, 250 B.R. at 881-82.
141. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2000) (providing that an individual is not discharged from an
education debt unless "excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph will impose an
undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor's dependents").
142. In re McLeroy, 250 B.R. at 877-80.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 880 (emphasis added).
146. Id. at 881 (quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1,
6-7 (2002)).
147. See supranotes 102-120 and accompanying text.
148. See 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(8) (2000); see also supranote 140.
149. See, e.g., In re McLeroy, 250 B.R. at 878-80.
150. Id. at 881.
151. Id.
at 882.
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provision of the Bankruptcy Code in order to define the contours of another right,
can only be distinguished from McLeroy by positing the argument that section
503(b)(3)(B) would be rendered utterly meaningless without such judicial "expansion," 152 and section 523(a)(8) would only have less meaning. 153 However,
Blount's, and ultimately CybergenicsIll's, arguments that 503(b)(3)(B) is rendered
"superfluous" or "meaningless" without court sanctioned derivative standing is
154
persuasively refuted by Judge Fuentes's arguments in his CybergenicsIII dissent.
Judge Fuentes catalogs cases where the use of section 503(b)(3)(B) by individual
creditors was possible without the judicial expansion of the trustee's avoidance
155
powers.
B. Inherent Differences in the Purposesof the Bankruptcy Chapters
In Cybergenics II, the Creditors' Committee argued vigorously to distinguish
Hartford Underwriters.156 The first argument expounded upon the inherent dif15 7
ferences between Chapter 7 liquidations and Chapter 11 reorganization cases.
The court cited Third Circuit precedent acknowledging that "Congress intended a
creditors' committee to have more extensive rights in a reorganization than in a
liquidation." 158 However, the court then pointed out that in the case at bar there
was no reorganization: the debtor had chosen to sell its assets at auction rather than
reorganize. 159 Regardless, the court surveyed the reasoning employed by other
courts in allowing derivative creditor avoidance suits in Chapter 11 reorganization
cases. 160 The court pointed out that other circuits and bankruptcy courts have
often found the authority for creditors' committees to stand in the trustee's shoes
16 1
by combining the implications of sections 1 103(c)(5) and 1109(b).
Section 1109, as construed by the Third Circuit, raises in creditors' committees "a broad right to be heard, including, among other powers, an unconditional
right to intervene in a Chapter 11 adversary proceeding that has been initiated by a
trustee." 162 Section 1109(b) reads: "[a] party in interest, including the debtor, the
trustee, a creditors' committee, an equity security holders' committee, or any indenture trustee, may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue in a case
under this chapter." 163 In construing this statutory language, the Third Circuit
applied the "plain meaning" approach of Hartford Underwriters.164 The court
152. See supra notes 102-120 and accompanying text for discussion of the arguments raised
in In re Blount. See also Cybergenics Ii, 330 F.3d 548, 563-66 (3d Cir. 2003) (concluding that
"if standing to recover is limited exclusively to the trustee-that ... would render § 503(b)(3)(B)
entirely superfluous").
153. See In re McLeroy, 250 B.R. at 881.
154. Cybergenics III, 330 F.3d at 583-84 (Fuentes, J., dissenting).
155. Id.
156. Cybergenics II, 304 F.3d 316, 325-27 (3d Cir. 2002).
157. Id. at 325.
158. Id. (quoting In re Matin Motor Oil, Inc., 689 F.2d 445, 450 (3d Cir. 1982)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
159. Id. at 325 n.12.
160. Id. at 325-27.
161. Id. (collecting cases).
162. Id. at 326.
163. 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (2000).
164. Cybergenics II, 304 F.3d at 326. Hartford Underwriters is often referred to in legal
commentary as a "return to plain meaning" in reference to the style of statutory interpretation
employed by the Court. See, e.g., Bloom & Solomon, supra note 14, at 420-25.
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was unwilling to allow a broad "'right to be heard"' provision to serve as an implicit expansion of section 544, which confers a specific right to a specific party,
the trustee. 165 To do so, the court held, would "expand the intent evidenced by the
plain, specific language used by Congress in [section] 544(b)."' 16 6 The decision to
reject such an expansion was bolstered further by dicta in Hartford Underwriters,
where the Supreme Court indicated that it would not construe section 1109 as a
statutory basis for a non-trustee to bring suit under a provision granting exclusive
authority to a trustee. 167 Although section 1109 applies to reorganization and
Hartford Underwritersinvolved a liquidation, the Court asserted "in any event,
we do not read [section] 1 109(b)'s general provision of a right to be heard as broadly
allowing a creditor to pursue substantive remedies that other Code provisions make
' 16 8
available only to other specific parties.
The CybergenicsII court disposed of the section 1103(c) argument in similar
fashion. 169 Section 1103(c) of the Bankruptcy Code reads in pertinent part: "A
committee appointed under section 1102 of this title may... perform such other
services as are in the interest of those represented."' 170 The court rejected the
argument that "other services" included commencing suit. 17 1 Although subsection (c)(5) could be characterized as a "catch all," they refused to read this catch all
1 73
72
Instead, the court, invoked ejusdem generis,
as a "roving grant of power."1
"'a familiar canon of statutory construction,' [that] catch-all provisions 'are to be
read as bringing within a statute categories similar in type to those specifically
enumerated."' ' 174 The court looked at subsections (c)(1)-(4) and found that a right
to initiate suit was not akin to the specifically enumerated rights of participation,
consultation or investigation. 175 It characterized section 1103 as authorizing "only
176
limited, discrete rights of participation for a committee."
The court noted that Congress had explicitly granted the trustee the capacity
to sue and be sued and asserted that there was no analogous conveyance of function or duty to the creditor's committee in section 1103 or anywhere else in the
Code. 17 7 Although agreeing that sections 1103 and 1109 conferred significant
authority to creditors' committees in Chapter 11 proceedings, the court declined to
178
find that they provided the authority for court sanctioned derivate standing.
Interestingly, the Cybergenics II court did not analyze section 503 and its refer165. Cybergenics II, 304 F.3d at 326 (quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v.Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1, 8 (2000)).
166. Id.
167. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. at 7.
168. Id. at 8.
169. Cybergenics II, 304 F.3d at 326-27.
170. 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(5) (2000).
171. Cybergenics II, 304 F.3d at 327.
172. Id. at 326 (internal quotations omitted).
173. This is a "canon of construction that when a general word or phrase follows a list of
specific persons or things, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only persons
or things of the same type as those listed." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 535 (7th ed. 1999).
174. Cybergenics II, 304 F.3d at 326-27 (quoting Fed. Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain Line,
Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 734 (1973)).
175. Id. at 327; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c).
176. Cybergenics II, 304 F.3d at 327.
177. Id. at 326.
178. Id. at 327.
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ence to "creditors who recover" for any possible implicit conveyance of authority
to creditors. 179 The court determined that the Code does not permit creditors'
committees to pursue avoidance actions derivatively irrespective of "whether the
trustee fails to act and/or the committee secures court approval," and the court
asserted that any judicially created criterion for expanding section 544 is textually
unjustified. 180

C. Footnote Five of Hartford Underwriters
Hartford Underwritersholds that individual creditors may not assert an independent right to pursue the recovery of administrative expenses pursuant to Code
section 506(c). 181 Hartford Underwriters does not indicate whether a creditor
may ask the bankruptcy court for permission to pursue recovery under section
506(c) in the trustee's stead, i.e., derivatively.182 In footnote five of Hartford Underwriters,the Supreme Court expressly declined to pass upon the validity of derivative standing in regard to administrative recovery under section 506(c) or in
183
regard to avoidance actions under sections 544, 545,547(b), 548(a), and 549(a).
Many courts have relied on footnote five in order to limit the impact of Hartford
Underwritersto issues arising under section 506.184 In 2001, a Massachusetts
bankruptcy court declared that Hartford Underwriterswas a mere "red herring"
with no substantive impact upon the validity of court sanctioned derivative standing in bankruptcy proceedings. 185 The Third Circuit Panel explored the "red her179. See id. See also supra notes 100-119 and accompanying text for discussion of the
arguments raised in In re Blount. This failure may be explained by Judge Fuentes' dissent in
Cybergenics IlI. In his dissent, Judge Fuentes posits that, were creditors' committees to pursue
avoidance actions in the trustee's stead, section 503 would not be the appropriate provision for
the recovery of their administrative expenses. Cybergenics III, 330 F.3d 548, 583-84 (3d Cir.
2003). If this argument is accepted, it breaks the majority's "chain of inference."
180. Cybergenics II, 304 F.3d at 327.

181. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1, 14 (2000).
182. Id. at 13 n.5.
183. Id. "Footnote five" is a controversial and frequently cited note in Hartford Underwriters; the Court referenced the section 544 practice at issue in Cybergenics I and declined to
decide its validity at that time. Id. The text of the note reads as follows:
We do not address whether a bankruptcy court can allow other interested parties to act
in the trustee's stead in pursuing recovery under § 506(c). Amici... draw our attention to the practice of some courts of allowing creditors or creditors' committees a

derivative right to bring avoidance actions when the trustee refuses to do so, even
though the applicable Code provisions, see 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 545, 547(b), 548(a),
549(a), mention only the trustee. See, e.g. In re Gibson Group, Inc., 66 F.3d 1436,
1438 (6th Cir. 1995). Whatever the validity of that practice, it has no analogous application here, since petitioner did not ask the trustee to pursue payment under § 506(c)
and did not seek permission from the Bankruptcy Court to take such action in the
trustee's stead. Petitioner asserted an independent right to use § 506(c), which is what

we reject today. Cf. In re Xonics Photochemical, Inc., 841 F.2d 198, 202-03 (6th Cir.
1988) (holding that a creditor had no right to bring avoidance action independently,
but noting that it might have been able to seek to bring derivative suit).
Id.
184. See, e.g., Jackson v. Russell (In re Dur Jac Ltd.), 254 BR. 279, 286 n.7 (Bankr. M.D.
Ala. 2000); see also Cybergenics II, 304 F.3d at 327 (discussing the treatment of footnote five
by other courts).
185. Cybergenics II, 304 F.3d at 327-28 (quoting Together Dev. Corp. v. Pappas (In re Together Dev. Corp.), 262 B.R. 586,589 (Bankr. D. Mass., 2001) [hereinafter Together Dev. Corp.]).
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ring" theory and dismissed it as misguided. 186 Such courts, the panel concluded,
187
had focused too discretely upon the factual setting of Hartford Underwriters.
According to CybergenicsII, the real mandate-the real holding--of Hartford
Underwriterscannot be distinguished away: courts should construe the Bankruptcy
Code according to its plain meaning. 188 Courts that have disregarded the impact
of Hartford Underwritersupon derivative standing have overlooked the substance
of the decision. 189 The Supreme Court's edict regarding "plain meaning" Code
construction is relevant to all Code provisions containing an express grant of power
to the trustee. 190 Courts confronted with the words "the trustee may" from anywhere in the Bankruptcy Code should defer to Hartford Underwritersstrict constructionist style rather than conjure up implicit grants of authority. 19 1
Some courts have posited that footnote five is the Supreme Court's "recognition of the policy considerations that are the genesis of [a] long standing bankruptcy practice" 192 In Together Development Corporationv. Pappas,for example,
the Second Circuit found that court-sanctioned derivative standing under sections
544, 545, 547(b), 548(a), and 549(a) is grounded in policy, history, efficiency and
the status quo and that, pursuant to footnote five, it is undisturbed by Hartford
Underwriters.19 3 In contrast, the Cybergenics Ii court read footnote five
"plainly." 194 The Third Circuit Panel concluded that the Supreme Court had simply declined to decide an issue that was not squarely before it. 19 5 This interpretation is supported by the HartfordUnderwritersopinion, where the Court announced
that contemplating the merits of various bankruptcy policies was the province of
Congress and not the Court. 196 The Supreme Court was ultimately unwilling to
go beyond a natural reading of the Bankruptcy Code in order to shape a policybased outcome. 197 Therefore, it would be ironic to conclude that they included
footnote five as an implicit endorsement of a particular bankruptcy "policy." The
Cybergenics II court acknowledged this irony and concluded that no such argument could be reconciled with any language in the Hartford Underwritersdecision. 198
186. Id. The Cybergenics II court examined Together Dev. Corp. in detail because it is one of
the few opinions that sets forth a substantive analysis of Hartford Underwritersbefore reaching
the decision to disregard it. Id.
187. Id.

188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See id. at 328-29.
191. See id. See, e.g., Together Dev. Corp., 262 B.R. 586, 591-92 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2001).
The TogetherDev. Corp.court could find "no provision of the Code thatprohibitsthe Committee's
action herein." Id. at 591. In addition, the court derived implicit authority for court sanctioned
derivative standing from sections 1103 and 1109. Id. at 591-92.
192. See, e.g., Together Dev. Corp., 262 B.R. at 591.
193. Id. at 591-92 (referring to the practice at issue as "longstanding," "not simply pre-Code
practice, but rather current practice," "well entrenched," and "cost and time efficient.").
194. See Cybergenics R,304 F.3d at 328.
195. Id. at 329 n. 13 ("The Court did not reach the derivative suit issue with regard to [s]ection
506(c) or other provisions because it simply was not presented .... ").
196. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1, 13-14 (2000) ("In
any event, we do not sit to assess the relative merits of different approaches to various bankruptcy problems. It suffices that the natural reading of the text produces the result we announce.
Achieving a better policy outcome... is a task for Congress, not the courts.").
197. Id.
198. Cybergenics II, 304 F.3d at 328-29.
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D. Policy, PriorPracticeand Pragmatism
1. Policy and PriorPractice
Many commentators and courts argue that prior bankruptcy practice, pragmatism and policy distinguish derivative rights under sections 544, 545,547(b), 548(a),
and 549(a) from an independent right under section 506(c) and, therefore, distinguish HartfordUnderwriters.199 Before resting CybergenicsII squarely on "plain
meaning" statutory construction, the court explored these arguments. 200 The Supreme Court has held that, "'in expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a
single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole
law, and to its object and policy."' 20 1 However, the Supreme Court has also held
that any party arguing to expand the text of the Bankruptcy Code beyond its natural reading must meet an exceptionally heavy burden of persuasion. 202 In light of
both statements, the Third Circuit determined that policy considerationscan only
be used to expand the plain meaning, or naturalreading,of the Bankruptcy Code
in exceptional circumstances.203 The court concluded that there were no such
exceptional circumstances militating in favor of expanding the use of the sections
544, 545, 547(b), 548(a), and 549(a). 204 The court acknowledged that the history
of derivative avoidance actions at common law and under the earliest versions of
the Code was more compelling than the history of independent rights under 506(c)
and its forerunners. 205 However, the court did not believe that this history could
overcome the natural meaning of the language "the trustee may."206 The Third
Circuit adopted the HartfordUnderwritersconclusion that the language "the trustee
207
may" left no room for clarification by prior practice.
2. Pragmatism(addressingthe realitiesof Chapter11 reorganization)
The Cybergenics Creditors' Committee argued that conflicts of interest are
inherent to the reorganization process and that debtors-in-possession are inappropriately influenced by these conflicts. 208 The Committee argued that derivative
standing was a necessary vehicle to police the reorganization process and to ensure
that the value of estate is maximized. 209 A debtor-in-possession, often existing
management in a financially distressed business, may use the trustee provisions to
favor certain creditors; may be unwilling to avoid transactions with a supplier or
lender with whom it hopes to continue a business relationship after a successful
199. See, e.g., Together Dcv. Corp., 262 B.R. 586, 591-92 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2001); Bloom &
Solomon, supranote 14, at 424-25.
200. Cybergenics II, 304 F.3d at 331-32.
201. Id. at 331 (quoting Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 43 (1986)) (emphasis added).
202. id. (citing Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. at 9).
203. See id.
204. See id.

205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. The court found that "[section] 544(b), using the same operative language as [section] 506(c), is just as clear and unambiguous, and the provision's meaning may not be altered
by prior practice." id. See also discussion of Hartford Underwriters,supra Part II.
208. Cybergenics II,
304 F3d at 332.
209. See id.
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reorganization; or may have developed friendships that make it difficult to choose
to pursue actions with severe economic impacts. 2 10 The Third Circuit acknowledged that other courts had been persuaded by this dilemma.2 11 Such courts have
relied on policy considerations and found that "'judicially created creditor derivative suit[s]"' were integral in side stepping conflicts of interest and concomitantly
furthering the goals of reorganization to the benefit of all creditors. 212 Together
Development, for example, explored potential conflicts of interest for the debtorin-possession in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding where the potential defendants of the avoidance action were themselves insiders of the debtor.2 13 The Creditors' Committee had discovered the potentially fraudulent transfers by debtor in2 14
siders; however, the debtor-in-possession refused to pursue the allegations.
The Together Development court analyzed the validity of the potential avoidance action by applying a four factor balancing test that had been set forth by a
California bankruptcy court in In re Catwil Corporation.2 15 The test contem216
plated criteria that, if satisfied, warranted the authorization of a derivative action.
The Together Development court found that the Catwil balancing test was legitimately premised on a combination of sections 1103(c)(5) and 1109(b) 2 17 and asserted, "[tihus, it is evident to this Court that the Bankruptcy Code anticipates and
provides for the approach pragmatically adopted by various other bankruptcy courts
'2 18
to deal with the conflicts arising with insiders of corporate bankruptcy debtors.
Together Development authorized the creditors in that case to prosecute avoidance
actions because, the court concluded, the Committee's actions were "overwhelmingly beneficial to all members of the Debtor's estate" and in furtherance of prin210. Id. at 332 n.15; See also RICHARD I. AARON, BANKRUiTyCY LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 10:1

(2003); Kirpalani, supranote 6, at 1. In response to Cybergenics II, many commentators have
argued the importance of judicial consideration of these conflicts of interest in bankruptcy pro-

ceedings:
In a quest to maximize value, the parties who are best positioned to rehabilitate a

company's operating performance may not be the parties to investigate the pre-bankruptcy malfeasance of their colleagues or the board. Instead of forcing the estate to

choose a team best suited for one, but not both, mission, bankruptcy courts (until
Cybergenics 11)had the flexibility to accommodate both objectives by authorizing

committees to investigate and prosecute such causes of action on behalf of the estate.
Id.
211. Cybergenics
212. Id.

,304 F.3d at 331-32.

213. 262 B.R. 586, 591 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2001). See supra notes 185-193 and accompanying
text for the discussion of other aspects of this case.
214. Together Dev. Corp., 262 B.R. at 589.
215. 175 B.R. 362 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1994). "IT]he Catwil court weighed four factors: (1)
whether the defendants were insiders of the debtor; (2) whether the debtor was fully aware of the
committee's intent to file the actions; (3) whether time was of the essence in filing the complaints; and, (4) whether there was any likelihood of confusion as to which party would pursue
the claims." Together Dev. Corp., 262 B.R. at 589-90.
216. Id. at 590.
217. Id. at 589. Cf Cybergenics 111, 330 F.3d 548, 559-67 (3d Cir. 2003).
218. Together Dev. Corp., 262 B.R. at 590.
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2 19

cipals of the Code.
According to Together Development, if derivative standing
was invalidated, it would give rise to a "serious abuse of the bankruptcy system"
' 220
that could not be "countenanced by the Bankruptcy Code or [the courts].
The Sixth Circuit has also voiced concerns that conflicts of interest may wield
inappropriate influence upon a debtor-in-possession. 22 1 In 1995, the court held
that a bankruptcy court may grant an individual creditor the authority to initiate an
avoidance action derivatively, if the creditor:
(1) has alleged a colorable claim that would benefit the estate, if successful, based
on a cost-benefit analysis performed by the court; (2) has made a demand on the
debtor-in-possession to file the avoidance action; (3) the demand has been refused; and, (4) the refusal is unjustified in light of the statutory obligations and
222
fiduciary duties of the debtor-in-possession in a Chapter 11 reorganization.
In this pre-Hartford Underwritersdecision, the court found that, while the Bankruptcy Code does not expressly authorize a creditors' committee to act in the trustee's
stead, it does not expressly prohibit such action either.223 The court decided that,
under the circumstances of the case at bar, court authorized derivative standing
would further the broader goals and purposes of the Bankruptcy Code. 224 The
court opined:
A debtor-in-possession often acts under the influence of conflicts of interest and
may be tempted to use its discretion under [s]ections 547 and 548 as a sword to
favor certain creditors over others, rather than as a tool to further its reorganization for the benefit of all creditors as Congress intended. Given this reality, we
do not believe Congress intended to exclude creditors from seeking to avoid preferential or fraudulent transfers where the debtor-in-possession abuses its discre225
tion.
In accordance with this perception of Congressional intent, the Gibson court
found that the judiciary had the authority to analyze the action or inaction of debtors-in-possession and to confer standing upon creditors when equitable. 22 6 Look219. Id. at 591. The court opined that derivative creditor standing was:

premised on the parties expectations of the utilitarian, time tested process which has
evolved in bankruptcy law and under the Bankruptcy Code in order to ensure that
appropriate lawsuits proceed in cases where debtor's counsel has some reason not to
pursue all potential assets of the estate due to a conflict of interest, be that conflict
real or perceived.
Id. at 591-92 (emphasis added).
220. Id. at 592. The court viewed the creditors' committee as a vehicle to ensure the furtherance of the purposes and policies of bankruptcy, and as a safeguard "against certain potential
gaps in the handling of a bankrupt estate." Id. Derivative creditor avoidance actions were
described as a "practical solution of permissive delegation in order to avoid an insider's circumvention of either the letter or the spirit of the Bankruptcy Code." Id.
221. Cybergenics II, 304 F.3d 316, 331-32 (3d Cir. 2002).
222. Canadian Pac. Forest Products Ltd. v. J.D. Irving Ltd. (In re Gibson), 66 F.3d 1436,
1438 (6th Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Gibson].
223. Id. at 1440-41. The Gibson court surveyed the Code for possible sources of authority
for creditors to initiate avoidance actions. Id. at 1145 n. 1. The court acknowledged that the
authority "might" be derived from the section 1109, "Right to be Heard" provision, but declined
to follow that theory. Id.
224. See id.
225. Id. at 1441.
226. See id. at 1438-42.
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ing to the purposes of Chapter 11 reorganization, the court concluded that although
reorganization did not mandate estate "maximization," it did require that the trustee
or debtor-in-possession act to conserve and protect assets. 2 27 Given these duties,
the Sixth Circuit concluded that the failure of a debtor-in-possession to pursue an
avoidance action might be characterized as an abuse of discretion if the inaction
was "unjustified.' 228 The court discussed the debtor-in-possession's fiduciary duties
and offered some guidance as to how a bankruptcy court might assess whether a
debtor-in-possession's actions, or lack thereof, were unjustified. 229 Ultimately,
Gibson concluded that the judiciary is responsible for policing Chapter 11 reorganizations in order to ensure that the broad purposes and policies of bankruptcy are
carried out.
The Seventh Circuit has also concluded that judicially conferred derivative
standing is a means to police a debtor-in-possession's potential conflicts of interest. 230 In this case, Xonics, the debtor-in-possession, was acting, as opposed to
failing to act, to set aside a payment to one of its suppliers (as a voidable preference pursuant to section 547(b)). 23 1 The supplier, Mitsui, contended that Xonics
was not insolvent at the time of the disputed payment, and, therefore, the payment
could not be avoided. 232 Mitsui argued that the validity of Xonics's insolvency at
the time of the payment was dependant upon the validity of several inter-affiliate
transactions between itself and its parent corporation: these transactions were responsible for the creation of Xonics's liabilities. 233 If the transactions with Xonics's
parent corporation were avoidedfirst, then there would be no insolvency basis for
Xonics to avoid its payment to Mitsui. 234 In analyzing this argument, the Seventh
Circuit found that Mitsui was "entitled to wonder whether the refusal by the debtor[]in[-]possession to try to void the [allegedly fraudulent transactions with its parent
corporation] was really made in good faith." 235 To this end, the court instructed
that Mitsui could have done one of two things: first, it could have sought the appointment of a trustee under section 1104; or second, it could have sought the
permission of the bankruptcy court "to bring a form of derivative suit in the name
of the debtor.' 236 The latter option, the court opined, required the party seeking
the suit to convince the court that "the debtor was [somehow] shirking its statutory
''237
responsibilities.
227. Id. at 1442. The court found that the purpose of Chapter 11:
is to provide a debtor with legal protection in order to give it the opportunity to reorganize, and thereby to provide creditors with going-concern value rather than the
possibility of a more meager satisfaction through liquidation. Therefore, maximization of the value of the estate is not necessarily the primary goal of a... reorganization.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1442-46.
230. In re Xonics Photochemical, Inc., 841 F.2d 198, 203 (7th Cir. 1988).
231. Id. at 199.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 201. Mitsui argued "that Xonics Photochemical was not insolvent when they were
made because the transactions between it and its affiliates were (1) void under state law... or
(2) voidable as fraudulent conveyances." Id.
234. See id. at 201-02.
235. Id. at 202.
236. Id. at 202-03.
237. Id. at 203.
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In 2001, the Second Circuit held that court-sanctioned derivative standing
during a Chapter 11 reorganization helped realize the broader policies and purposes of bankruptcy law: alleviating debtor-in-possession conflicts of interest, as
well as conserving estate resources. 238 The court noted that a debtor-in-possession might want to request a creditors' committee to prosecute insiders, former
insiders, customers, or vendors in order to avoid conflicts of interest. 239 Further,
allowing a creditors' committee to pursue the litigation might better serve the bankruptcy estate by effecting a "reasoned and practicable division of labor."24 0 In re
Commodore InternationalLimited evolved out of a complex web of multi-national
litigation. 24 1 In this case, the debtor-in-possession had agreed to let the Creditors'
Committee initiate an adversary proceeding that it did not have the resources to
pursue independently. 242 The district court reviewed Second Circuit precedent
and determined that "creditors' committees have an implied... right.., to initiate
adversary proceedings ... only when the trustee or debtor[-]in[-]possession unjustifiably fail[s] to bring suit or abuse[s] its discretion in not suing to avoid a preferential transfer.' 24 3 Ultimately, the circuit court reversed this decision, finding that
a creditors' committee "[may] also obtain standing with [a debtor-in-possession's]
consent and bankruptcy court approval." 2 44 The circuit court acknowledged that
the debtor-in-possession is the usual party to initiate an adversary proceeding, but
held that creditors' committees maintain a qualified right to initiate such proceedings, in the debtor-in-possession's name, and on behalf of the estate, if the bank24 5
ruptcy court consents.
In defining the scope of a committee's "qualified" right to initiate adversary
proceedings the Second Circuit relied on In re Spaulding Composites,246 which
was decided by the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit. 247 The
Spaulding Composites court had held that "a debtor[-]in[-]possession may stipulate to representation by an unsecured creditors' committee" so long as it obtains
bankruptcy court approval. 24 8 The Second Circuit summarized and adopted the
Ninth Circuit B.A.P.'s approach:
(1) A creditors' committee may acquire standing to pursue the debtor's claims if:
(1) the committee has the consent of the debtor-in-possession or trustee, and (2)
the court finds that suit by the committee is (a) in the best interest of the bankruptcy estate, and (b) is "necessary and beneficial" to the fair and efficient reso249
lution of the bankruptcy proceedings.
238. Commodore Int'l Ltd. v.Gould (In re Commodore Int'l Ltd.), 262 F.3d 96, 99-100 (2d
Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Commodore].
239. Id. at 99 (citing 3 COLLIER ON BANKRuPrcy § 1103.05 (3d Ed. 2001)).
240. Id. at 100.
241. Id. at 97-98.
242. Id. at 98.
243. Id. at 99 (quoting Commodore Int'l Ltd. v. Gould (In re Commodore Int'l Ltd.), 253
B.R. 336, 339 (S.D.N.Y 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). See also
Unsecured Creditors Comm. of Debtor STN Enters. Inc. v. Noyes (In re STN Enters.), 779 F.2d
901 (2d Cir. 1985).
244. Commodore, 262 F.3d at 98 (emphasis added).
245. Id.
246. 207 B.R. 899 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997).
247. Commodore, 262 F.3d at 99.
248. Id. at 99-100.
249. Id. at 100 (quoting Spaulding Composites, 207 B.R. at 94).
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In this respect, the Commodore Internationalcourt, like the Gibson court, examined the broad goals of bankruptcy law and asserted that bankruptcy courts should
have the latitude to ensure that these goals are realized. 250 In Commodore International, the Second Circuit adopted rules that provide bankruptcy courts with
significant latitude to "manage... litigation and to check [for] any potential...
abuse by the parties." 25 1 Under Commodore International,bankruptcy courts define what is "necessary and beneficial" in a bankruptcy case and can authorize or
252
reject adversary proceedings accordingly.
The Cybergenics H1 court contemplated the policy considerations underlying
Gibson and Together Development but concluded that they were not a sufficient
justification for overlooking the plain meaning of the text. 253 The Third Circuit
echoed Hartford Underwriters,finding that the task of "fashion[ing] a new procedure" to address these issues was a task for Congress and not the courts. 254 The
court indicated that "[iut might well be sound policy" to address the conflicts of
interest that confront a debtor-in-possession. 255 However, sound policy or not, the
court declined to find that the judiciary had the authority to sanction "such an
arrangement. ' 256 Instead, the Third Circuit proffered several alternatives available to creditors inclined to pursue avoidance claims should a debtor-in-possession, justifiably or unjustifiably, decline to do so: alternatives which would not
require going outside a plain reading of the Bankruptcy Code. 257 A discussion of
these alternatives follows.
V. THE PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF CYBERGENICS 11
A. Cybergenics II: DiscussionofAlternatives
The Third Circuit conceded that the practice of judicially authorizing creditor
derivative suits under section 544, the practice that it was rejecting, had continued
in several jurisdictions, including its own, beyond the issuance of HartfordUnderwriters.258 These cases were decided without any reference to Hartford Underwriters and, in some cases, without any comment on a committee's capacity to
250. See id. at 99-100.
251. Id. at 100.
252. See id.
253. Cybergenics II,304 F.3d 316, 332 (3d Cir. 2002). The court discussed the purposes of
Chapter 11 and acknowledged that the practical realities of reorganization generate conflicts of
interest. Id. at 332 n.15.
[M]anagement may be unwilling to set aside an avoidable transfer with a supplier or
lender with whom it intends to do future business after the business is successfully
reorganized. Friendships develop in business which may make the debtor[-]in[-]possession hesitant to sue. Therefore, a major problem in chapter 11 cases is assuring
that the debtor[-]in[-]possession performs the duties with the same faithful concern
for the interests of creditors as would be expected of an independent trustee.
Id. (quoting City Corp. Acceptance v. Robison (In re Sweetwater), 884 F.2d 1323, 1329 n.7
(10th Cir. 1989)).
254. Id. at 332 (internal citation and quotation omitted).
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 333.
258. Id. at 330 (collecting cases).
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bring the claim. 259 The operative theme among them, according to Cybergenics
II, was that none of the parties had raised the issue of derivative creditor standing. 260 For example, within the Third Circuit, in Official Committee of Unsecured
Creditors v.R.F Lafferty, 26 1 the parties had stipulated to the Committee's authority to assert the claim in the trustee's stead. 262 The debtor-in-possession apparently conceded to the capacity of the Committee to bring a derivative proceeding. 263 The Cybergenics II court, now squarely confronted with the question of
the practice's validity, opined that "[a] panel of this court is bound to follow the
holdings of published opinions of prior panels of this court unless overruled by the
court en banc or the holding is undermined by a subsequent Supreme Court case."' 264
In light of Hartford Underwriters,the Third Circuit panel decided all prior holdings authorizing creditor derivative suits under the Code's avoidance provisions
'265
could "no longer stand."
The court then contemplated the remedies available to a creditors' committee
when a debtor-in-possession will not--or cannot-commence an adversarial proceeding. First, under section 1103(c)(4), a creditors' committee may seek to have
a trustee or examiner appointed under section 1104.266 Second, the court suggested that a creditor could move to dismiss the bankruptcy proceeding under sec26 7
tion 1112 in order to pursue claims in state court under applicable state law.
The court noted that when Cybergenics, as debtor-in-possession, had declined to
pursue the avoidance claims pressed by the Committee, Cybergenics had moved to
dismiss its bankruptcy case. 268 If the Creditors' Committee had not objected to
this dismissal, then the individual creditors would have been able to pursue fraudulent transfer claims under New Jersey state law. 269 However, the court conceded
that "federal bankruptcy avoidance action[s] [have] a significant advantage over
avoidance claims brought under state law.' 270 The federal provision is often re259. Id.
260. Id.
261. 267 F.3d 340 (3d Cir. 2001).
262. Cybergenics II, 304 F3d at 330.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 330-31 (quoting United States v. Continental Airlines (Inre Continental Airlines),
134 F.3d 536, 542 (3d Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
265. Id. at 330.
266. Id. at 333. Section 1103 "Powers and duties of committees" reads in pertinent part: "[a]
committee appointed under section 1102 of this title may ... request the appointment of a
trustee or examiner under § 1104 of this title .... " 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c) (2000). Section 1104
"Appointment of trustee or examiner" provides that "[a]t any time after the commencement of
the case but before confirmation of a plan, on request of a party in interest or the United States
trustee, and after notice and a hearing, the court shall order the appointment of a trustee... for
cause... ." 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2000).
267. Cybergenics II, 304 F.3d at 333. Section 1112 "Conversion or Dismissal" provides that
"the court may convert ...or ...dismiss a case under this chapter, whichever is in the best
interest of creditors and the estate,for cause, including... [the] continuing loss to or diminution
of the estate and absence of a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation ....
" 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)
(2000) (emphasis added). The court also noted that any claim avoidable under section 544 is,
necessarily, a nonbankruptcy cause of action. Cybergenics II, 304 F.3d at 333 n.17. "The avoidance power under [section] 544(b) may be used to avoid transfers that are 'voidable under applicable state law..."' Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)) (internal citation omitted).
268. Cybergenics II,
304 F.3d at 333, n.17.

269. Id.
270. Id.
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ferred to as a "strong-arm provision" because it avoids a transfer in its entirety, for
the benefit of the bankruptcy estate as a whole, and is not limited in effect, like
state law provisions, to voiding the transfer only to the extent necessary to satisfy
27 1
the claim of an individual creditor.
In light of the alternatives, the Creditors' Committee proposed that the Third
Circuit remand so that it could have the opportunity to move for the appointment
of a trustee as the proper party in interest to raise the contested fraudulent conveyance claims. 272 The Committee relied on Rule 17(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which is "intended to prevent the forfeiture [of colorable claims] when
determination of the proper party to sue is difficult or when an understandable
mistake has been made. ' 27 3 The court, however, was unwilling to remand for a
belated opportunity to substitute the proper party in interest. 274 The court viewed
the Committee's litigation choices as understandable choices based upon prevailing law and not understandable mistakes.275 The court noted that even after the
defendants' second motion to dismiss, which argued the applicability of Hartford
Underwriters,the Committee still did not choose to move for a trustee to be ap' 2 76
pointed and "did not even argue for such an appointment in the alternative.
277
Because the issue had not been raised below, the court declined to address it now.
The Third Circuit Panel held that a creditor or creditors' committee may not initiate an avoidance action, affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss, and
278
declined to order a remand to explore the alternatives.
B. The Effect of Cybergenics IIwithin the Third Circuit
At the time that Cybergenics 11 came down, there were over 250 cases pending in the Third Circuit that would then require a substitution of the proper party in
interest to prosecute the claims or would need to be dismissed for the plaintiff's
lack of capacity to sue. 279 The decision to vacate CybergenicsII pending a rehear271. Id. "Section 544(b) ... allows an entire conveyance to be set aside no matter how small
the claim of the 'individual creditor actually holding the avoidance claim."' Id. (quoting
Cybergenics t, 226 F.3d 237, 245 (3d Cir. 2000)).
272. Id. at 333-35.
273. Id. at 333 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a) advisory committee's note) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (emphasis added). The text of the rule reads in pertinent part that "[n]o action
shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest
until a reasonable time has been allowed." FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a).
274. Cybergenics I, 304 F.3d at 334. The Committee was arguing for a characterization of
the issue at bar as "proper party in interest" as opposed to "standing per se" in an attempt to
bring itself within the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a). Id. The Third Circuit
agreed with the Committee's characterization: "The Committee satisfies constitutional and prudential requirements for standing in the case. However, it is not the real party in interest because
it is not entitled to enforce the avoidance claims under [section] 544(b)." Id. The court concluded that it was not appropriate to remand for substitution of the proper party in interest. Id.
275. Id. at 334-35.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Official Comm. of Asbestos Pers. Injury Claimants ex. rel. W.R. Grace Co. v. SealedAir
Corp. (In re W.R. Grace Co.), 285 B.R. 148, 155 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) [hereinafter Grace].
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ing en banc did not come down until November 20, 2002.280 During the month
that Cybergenics 11 was controlling law, a multi-billion dollar litigation was scheduled for trial in Delaware District Court; Cybergenics II left the parties involved,
28 1
and the court, scrambling to figure out the proper course of action.
Earlier that year, in March 2002, the Delaware court had granted permission
for two creditors' committees, the Personal Injury Committee and the Property
Damage Committee, to prosecute fraudulent conveyance claims in W.R. Grace's
bankruptcy case. 282 The court premised its decision on prior practice and precedent within the Third Circuit and found that "[t]he necessity of [the] order was
three-fold. ' 2 83 First, the potential recovery of the suit represented immense material value to the estate; the court listed the current book value of the debtor's assets
as 2.7 billion dollars while the potential recovery of the fraudulent conveyance
prosecution was over 3.8 billion dollars. 284 Second, "on the face of the papers"
the claims appeared to be at least colorable. 285 And, third, the debtor-in-possession's
prosecution of the claims seemed improbable if not impossible. 286 The debtor in
this case, W.R. Grace, was also the subject of asbestos litigation. 2 87 The success
of the disputed avoidance actions would depend, in part, on establishing W.R.
Grace's asbestos liability as of the date of the contested transfer.288 As such, W.R.
Grace could not prosecute the avoidance claims, because "regardless [of the value]
of the potential recovery for the estate, [such a] position would require it to con' 289
cede the merits of the asbestos claims against it."
The Committees's fraudulent conveyance claims were set to be litigated on
September 30, 2002; however, Cybergenics II interceded by ten days. 290 The
Delaware court convened a conference to determine how "best to salvage the case
280. Cybergenics 1I,
310 F.3d at 785-86. A majority of active Third Circuit judges voted to
vacate the Cybergenics II pending a rehearing en banc, however Judges Alito and Fuentes, who
had both voted in favor of the panel opinion, would have allowed it to stand pending en banc
review. Id.
281. Grace, 285 B.R. at 151-54.
282. Id. at 153. The W.R. Grace bankruptcy litigation is incredibly complex, including issues
of asbestos liability, Chapter 11 reorganization conflicts, and fraudulent conveyance claims all
intermingled and relatively interdependent. See generally id.
283. Id. at 152.
284. Id.
285. Id. The court cited to the Gibson decision for the rule that a creditor could be granted
derivative standing to bring an avoidance action if: the claim was colorable;the debtor-in-pos-

session refused to prosecute the claim; and, pursuit of the claim would be beneficial to the
bankruptcy estate. Id. The court apparently premised its belief that the claims were colorable,
at least in part, on the fact that the disputed transfers had been contested in litigation in multiple
jurisdictions before the debtor had even filed a bankruptcy petition. See id.See also Gibson, 66
F.3d 1436 (6th Cir. 1995).
286. Id. In a complex web of motions the debtor had previously moved to intervene and then
tried to withdraw from the proceedings. Id. However, in pre-petition litigation and at the early
stages of the action at bar, the debtor had continuously resisted the accusation that the challenged transfers were fraudulent. Id. at 152-53.
287. Id.

288. id. at 152.
289. Id. The factual disposition of this case presents a conflict of interest scenario not contemplated by the analogous cases addressed thus far in this Comment. In the instant case, the
need for a derivative action may have resulted from ajustified refusal of the debtor-in-possession to pursue the claim, which would stand in contrast to the unjustified refusal or consent
scenarios discussed earlier. See, e.g., Commodore, 262 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2001).
290. Grace, 285 B.R. at 153.
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and bring the substantive issues to trial." 29 1 The court issued an Order to Show
Cause and the parties were instructed to bring motions on the issue.292 On October 24, before Cybergenics H was vacated and set for en banc rehearing, the Grace
court handed down a decision reviewing its options, ordering that the fraudulent
conveyance claims would proceed to trial and issuing a sua sponte interlocutory
appeal to the Third Circuit. 293 The Grace opinion addressed the best of a "winnowed" field of options and expounded on their relative values to the situation at
bar: motion to dismiss, motion to appoint an examiner, motion to appoint a limited
purpose trustee, motion to appoint a plenary trustee, and, the motion ultimately
294
granted, motion to reset trial.
The defendants moved to dismiss the fraudulent conveyance action. 295 They
argued that remanding for the appointment of a trustee was the only tenable solution to the problem at hand and asserted that pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 17(a) it was no longer reasonable to remand the case for the appointment of a trustee. 296 Aligning themselves with Cybergenics II, the defendants
contended that their adversaries had had notice that their derivative capacity to sue
might be in jeopardy after the lower court had ruled on the issue. 297 The Delaware
court, however, disagreed and held that no litigant could have been expected to
anticipate the changes wrought by Cybergenics 11.298 The court was not willing to
accept the argument that "the only [tenable] solution to the . . . problem [was]
barred as untimely raised. ' 299 In fact, the court was not willing to accept that
there was only one tenable solution; it rejected the motion to dismiss and moved
300
on to consider the other motions seriatim.
The court examined the possibility of appointing an examiner, a limited purpose trustee, or a plenary trustee as the proper party in interest to prosecute the
291. Id. at 154. The court noted that it had set an expedited pace to bring the matter to trial
because efforts toward an effective reorganization would likely be hampered, if not precluded,
by the uncertainty represented by an unresolved fraudulent conveyance claim. Id. at 153. The
court summarized the immense "case management challenge" that the parties undertook in preparing an unduly complex litigation for trial in only five months and found fees and expenses
thus far totaled in excess of 16.7 million dollars. Id. at 153-54.
292. Id. at 154.
293. Id. at 162-63. The court anticipated that application for interlocutory appeal would be
forthcoming, so it moved to issue the order on its own. Id. at 162. Finding itself in "uncharted
waters," the court acknowledged that there was "substantial ground for a difference of opinion"
with regard to the order it had issued. Id. Unequivocally wishing to avoid an "unconscionable"
waste of assets or "deprive all the parties of the benefits of the expedited resolution they [had]
worked hard to achieve" the court sent the case to the circuit court for resolution of the "plainly"
controlling issue of law. Id. at 162-63.
294. Id. at 154-62. The motion to reset trial also included a motion to prohibit participation
by the debtor, which the court denied. Id. at 162. Participation by the debtor in these proceedings was in and of itself a heavily litigated issue which the court chose not to revisit in depth in
this particular opinion. Id.
295. Id. at 154.
296. Id. at 154-55.
297. Id. See also supra Part V.A. (discussing Cybergenics I's analysis of Rule 17(a)).
298. Grace, 285 B.R. at 154-55. The court noted that even Cybergenics Ihad "treated derivative capacity to sue ...
as a settled issue" and had not questioned the validity of the practice. Id.
at 155.
299. Id.
300. Id.
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The debtor, W.R. Grace, and two other parties
fraudulent conveyance claims.
to this case moved to appoint an "examiner with expanded powers. ' 302 The parties argued that section 1106 authorizes an examiner not only to investigate but
also to prosecute a fraudulent conveyance claim when the debtor refuses to do
so. 303 Section 1106(b) reads, in pertinent part, "'[a]n examiner... shall perform
[certain specified duties of a trustee] and.., any other duties of the trustee that the
court orders the debtor[-]in[-]possession not to perform."' 304 The Grace court
surveyed several lower court opinions authorizing an examiner to prosecute fraudulent conveyance actions, but then rejected the reasoning employed in those decisions. 305 The court found that when a debtor-in-possession exercises its right not
to prosecute an action, it is exercising a statutorily based prerogative. 306 The court
refused to equate this choice not to act with a court order not to act, the latter of
which is a necessary element of section 1106.307 To make such a "leap:' the court
reasoned, would be to reject two fundamental principles implicated by Cybergenics
11: first, a section 544 action is the sole statutory prerogative of the trustee or debtor308
in-possession; and second, the Bankruptcy Code should be read literally.
The court rejected a limited purpose trustee in the same fashion, reasoning:
"[tihere is no such entity... under the Code." 309 The court also found that the coexistence of a limited purpose trustee and a debtor-in-possession would be inher310
ently problematic should disagreement as to the best interests of the estate arise.
Splitting the role of "representative of the estate" between two parties-particularly
two parties with antagonistic goals regarding a fraudulent conveyance claim-is
not a workable solution. 311 On the other hand, the court found that a plenary,
"typical, non-limited purpose Chapter 11 trustee," would, at least, allow the case
to go forward on unquestioned legal footing. 3 12 However, the court denied the
motion to appoint a trustee, because "where the impetus for a trustee [in this case]
stems from the single issue of the fraudulent conveyance action, . . . a trustee
should be a last resort."' 3 13 In light of all the confusion, however, the court set
301. Id. at 155-60.
302. Id. at 155 (internal quotation omitted). The debtor, as well as the Property Committee
and the Equity Committee all moved for this option under section 1104(c). Id.
303. Id. at 155-56.
304. Id. at 156 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1106(b)) (ellipses and textual changes in original) (emphasis added).
305. Id. at 157.
306. Id. at 156.

307. Id.
308. Id. The court also doubted whether the concept of an examiner as a prosecutor of fraudulent conveyance claims would be consistent with Code conceptually. Id. Noting that an examiner is not authorized by the Code to retain counsel or hire other professionals, the court found it
"difficult to see how an examiner could function as a true plaintiff in a complex fraudulent
conveyance action." Id.
309. Id.at 157.
310. Id.

311. Id.
312. Id. The court noted that "the Court of Appeals has expressly approved the appointment
of a trustee where appropriate to prosecute a fraudulent conveyance action when the debtor
refuses to act." Id. at 156.
313. Id. at 160. Section 1104 gives the court the authority to appoint a trustee "for cause,
including fraud, dishonesty, incompetence or gross mismanagement of the affairs of the debtor
by current management ... if such appointment is in the interest of the creditors, any equity
" 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2000). Court
security holders, and other interests of the estate ....
findings under this section mandate the appointment of a trustee. Grace, 285 B.R. at 158.
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forth some preliminary findings on the issue so that the option would not be foreclosed. 3 14 The circumstances of the case, according to the court, suggested that
the debtor's refusal to prosecute the fraudulent conveyance claims might well rise
to the level of cause required under section 1104(a)(1) or (2) of the Bankruptcy
Code for the appointment of a trustee, despite the inherent disruption of displacing
3 15
a debtor-in-possession and despite the late stage in the proceeding.
The court ultimately granted the motion to reset trial and based its decision on
two grounds. 316 First, the court held that it was compelled to protect the investments of the estate and of the defendant in preparation for litigation. 317 Emphasizing that "this matter was on the eve of a very complex trial," the court invoked
its authority under section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code to issue any order "necessary or appropriate," in order to relax the rule of Cybergenics 11.318 Second, the
court indicated that the procedural posture of Cybergenics II "militates in favor of
relief from its holding here.' 319 With the petition for rehearing en banc still pendig at that time, the court found that the Cybergenics 11 "mandate" had not yet
firmly issued. 320 Extensive delay while the Cybergenics appellate process unraveled was not acceptable to the court. 32 1 The court found that resetting the W.R.
Grace matter for trial would do little to erode the precedential value of Cybergenics
II because no other case was "likely to find itself in the peculiar circumstances of
322
... a multi-billion dollar litigation, days from trial."
After resetting the trial, the
court issued a certificate for interlocutory appeal, and put the case in queue for the
323
Third Circuit Court of Appeals to resolve without further waste of resources.
324
In re TEU Holdings was also before a Delaware bankruptcy court in No325
vember 2002, before Cybergenics II was vacated pending rehearing en banc.
The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors in this case had filed an adversary
proceeding in February 2002 pursuant to a court order authorizing them to pursue
avoidance actions against various former officers and/or directors of the debtor-inpossession. 326 One of the claims for relief stated in the Committee's complaint
was for the avoidance of certain payments to these insiders as fraudulent transfers. 327 The bankruptcy court raised the Cybergenics II issue sua sponte, and decided, accordingly, that an appropriate basis for dismissal was apparent from the
314. Grace, 285 B.R. at 157-60.
315. Id. at 159.
316. Id. at 160.
317. Id. at 160-61.
318. Id. at 161. Section 105 reads in pertinent part: 'The court may issue any order, process,
or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title." 11 U.S.C.
§ 105(a) (2000).
319. Grace, 285 B.R. at 161.
320. Id.
321. Id. The court opined that "[t]he likelihood increases with each passing week that witness preparations will become stale, experts will become unavailable, and team members will
move on, to name but a few of the vicissitudes of litigation delayed." Id.
322. Id. at 161-62.
323. Id. at 162-63.
324. 287 B.R. 26 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002).
325. Id. at 26.
326. Id. at 29.
327. Id. at 41.
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The fraudulent transfer claim was dismissed and the
face of the complaint.
prior order that it had authorized was vacated. 329 The court gave no further comment to the consequences of Cybergenics 11-its ambiguous appellate status or its
potentially inequitable effect-other than to conclude that it was controlling and to
330
apply it to the case at bar.
In In re Parcel Consultants,33 1 the Creditors' Committee had initiated an ad332
versary proceeding seeking to set aside five payments as avoidable preferences.
When Cybergenics 1I was issued, the change in controlling law was applied to the
ongoing proceeding, apparently, swiftly and without issue. 333 In this Chapter 11
proceeding, however, a reorganization plan had already been confirmed, a trust
had been formed from the four entities comprising the debtor, and, most significantly, a trustee had been appointed. 334 This procedural posture softened the impact of Cybergenics II: the Parcel Consultants Creditors' Committee was able to
duly submit an application to substitute the trustee as the plaintiff and proper party
in interest. 335 Parcel Consultantswas issued in December 2002, and the bankruptcy court noted, at that time, that Cybergenics II had been vacated pending a
rehearing en banc. 336 The court decided that it would, therefore, not assess the
validity of derivative creditor standing. 337 The decision never explicitly discusses
reinstating the Creditors' Committee as plaintiff, but they are the named plaintiff
in the opinion's caption and the court refers to the motions and arguments as "the
33 8
Committee's" motions and arguments.
Four months after the Third Circuit vacated CybergenicsII, bankruptcy courts,
waiting for the en bane decision to be handed down, were still confronting the
opinion's lingering impacts. 339 In In re Combustion Engineering, an "unofficial"
committee of "potential" tort creditors and an individual tort creditor came before
the court in an effort to get a temporary restraining order to prohibit the debtor
from making preferential payments. 340 The court denied the request for a temporary restraining order because the moving parties failed to prove a likelihood of
success on the merits as is necessary for the court to grant such extraordinary
328. Id. "A court 'may on its own initiative enter an order dismissing the action provided that
the complaint affords a sufficient basis for the court's action."' Id. (quoting Bryson v. Brand
Insulations, Inc., 621 F.2d 556, 559 (3d Cir. 1980)).
329. Id.
330. See id.
331. 287 B.R. 41 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002).
332. Id. at 42-43.
333. Id. at 42-43, 43 n.l.
334. Id. at 43.
335. Id. at43 n.1.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 41. See also id. at 43 ("the Committee's cross-motion is denied"); id. at 47 n.9
("the Committee requested further"); id. at 47 ("Even if the Committee were to establish").
339. See, e.g., Pre-Petition Comm. of Select Asbestos Claimants v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc.
(In re Combustion Eng'g, Inc.), 292 B.R. 515 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003).
340. Id. at 517. The official creditors committee had not yet been formed in this case. Id. at
520. The "potential" tort creditors were actually a group of law firms with a largely unidentified
group of theoretical clients holding theoretical claims. Id. at 517-20.
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preemptive relief.34 1 Furthermore, in light of Cybergenics II, the court questioned
whether tort creditors had the authority to challenge a debtor's pre- or post-petition transfers. 34 2 The court found that the validity of derivative creditor standing
was uncertain and refused to speculate as to whether either of the claimants would
343
be permitted to initiate a derivative action in the future.
VI. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS IN CONFLICT WITH
CYBERGENICS 11
In Cybergenics II, the Third Circuit, by its own acknowledgement, handed
down a decision that abandoned precedent and long-standing prior bankruptcy practice. 344 The holding wielded significant immediate impact upon the jurisdiction,
as evidenced by Grace, and, despite being vacated, continued to cast uncertainty
and confusion in Third Circuit bankruptcy courts, as evidenced by In re Combustion Engineering. Decisions issued in other jurisdictions have remarked upon the
issues raised by Cybergenics II, but none evidence an inclination to follow the
controversial Third Circuit decision. 345 Other courts have, instead, reaffirmed the
practice of authorizing creditors and creditors' committees to bring avoidance actions on behalf of the debtor in appropriate circumstances. 346 The resulting crossjurisdictional conflict in substantive bankruptcy law raises a variety of considerations. First, interested parties, particularly creditors, who are able to influence
where a debtor files a bankruptcy petition may try to urge filing in jurisdictions
where precedent clearly protects their interests in maximizing the estate through
avenues that have been tested and shaped by the practical realities of bankruptcy
practice. 34 7 And, second, although many of the courts choosing to preserve the
practice of derivative creditor avoidance actions have put forth well-reasoned opinions, it remains unavoidable that the Bankruptcy Code still "does not expressly
' 348
authorize the practice in a way that leaves no room for doubt.
341. Id. at 520. The court dismissed the unofficial creditors' committee's request for a TRO,
because the Committee did not represent a real party in interest. Id. at 517-19. The unofficial
"committee" did not, as of the time it appeared before the court, represent any actual creditors
with actual claims/interests against the debtor. Id. at 517-18. Analysis of the individual tort
creditor's request for a TRO was carried further because the court found him to be a real party in
interest. Id. at 518-19.
342. Id. at 520.
343. Id. The court opined:
The bankruptcy community in this Circuit awaits the decision of the Court of Appeals
on the reargument en banc in Cybergenicswith great anticipation. Whether the court
can authorize a committee to use the estate's avoidance powers is a matter of great
significance to bankruptcy lawyers and judges. Regardless of the outcome, however,
this court is asked to go one step beyond Cybergenics and is asked to predict that
either [of the creditors before the court] will be permitted to exercise avoidance powers in lieu of the Debtor .... [T]his court cannot go so far ....

Id.
344. Cybergenics II, 304 F.3d 316, 322 (3d Cir. 2002) ("Therefore, we must decide in this
case whether the plain language of § 544 and the holding of Hartford Underwriters invalidates
the rather well-established practice of allowing creditors and creditors' committees to bring
avoidance actions derivatively.").
345. See, e.g., Housecraft, 310 F3d 64 (2d Cir. 2002).
346. See id. at 70, 71.
347. See Hale and Dorr, supra note 16, at 2.

348. John J. Rapisardi, Part2: Circuitson Who Can ProsecuteEstate Avoidance Claims, 288
N.YL.J., *1, 5 November 21, 2002.
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A. The Eighth Circuit
In early 2002, before Cybergenics 11, a Missouri bankruptcy court was confronted with a case raising very similar issues. In In re Newcorn Enterprises,
Ltd.,349 the Official Unsecured Creditors' Committee sought leave from the bankruptcy court to file an adversary proceeding to marshal the debtor's assets. 350 The
debtor's sole secured creditor, Commercial Bank, objected to the Committee's
motion, arguing that Hartford Underwriters precluded the court from granting
derivative standing to a non-trustee. 35 1 Commercial Bank held a lien on proceeds
from the sale of debtor's assets, as well as a Deed of Trust to real property, which
had been pledged as collateral by the debtor's shareholders. 352 The Committee
was seeking to marshal the debtor's assets in an effort to get Commercial Bank's
secured interest in the shareholders' real property included in the bankruptcy estate. 353 If the Committee succeeded, Commercial Bank would be compelled "to
satisfy its claim against the estate, in part, from collateral pledged by ... shareholders rather than solely from [asset liquidation] proceeds." 354 This would leave
355
more of the proceeds available to satisfy the claims of the unsecured creditors.
The power to seek a marshalling of a debtor's assets arises under the rights
and powers conveyed to the trustee or debtor-in-possession in section 544(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code. 356 In this Chapter 11 case, the principal actor on behalf of the
debtor corporation, who was making estate decisions in the bankruptcy proceedings, was also one of the principal shareholders of the debtor and holder of the real
property at issue. 357 He would clearly benefit if Commercial Bank satisfied its
claims out of the liquidation proceeds and he retained title to his real property.358
In light of this conflict of interest, the court was not surprised that the debtor refused to file an action to marshal the assets of the estate. 35 9 The Committee argued that section 1109 gave it the authority to bring a marshalling complaint under
section 544(a) when a trustee or debtor-in-possession unreasonably refuses to do
so. 360 The Newcorn court noted that the Supreme Court, albeit in dicta, had rejected the argument that section 1109's "general provision of a right to be heard is
..broad enough to allow a creditor standing 'to pursue substantive remedies that
other Code provisions make available only to other specific parties.' ' ' 36 1 However, the Newcorn court also noted that the Supreme Court had not addressed the
349. 287 B.R. 744 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2002).
350. Id. at 745.
351. Id. at 746.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 745. The court noted that the Committee was seeking to act for the benefit of the
estate, "attempting to make the Debtor's asset pie larger in hopes of increasing the pay-out to
unsecured creditors after the lien of Commercial Bank is satisfied." Id. at 746.
355. Id.
356. Id. at 746-47.
357. Id.
358. See id.
359. Id. at 747.
360. ld. at 746. Section 1109 conveys a right to raise and be heard on any issue in any case
to any party in interest, including a creditors' committee. 11 U.S.C. § 1109 (2000).
361. In re Newcorn Enters., Ltd., 287 B.R. at 748 (quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v.
Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1,8 (2000)).
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merits of "whether a creditor or other interested party may obtain derivative standing to bring an action when a trustee has refused to act" and acknowledged that the
362
federal courts were split on the issue.
Surveying the various circuits, the Newcorn court found that courts granting
derivative standing to nontrustees generally require the interested party to establish the existence of a colorable claim, which if successful would benefit the es' 363
tate, making "the trustee/debtor-in-possession's refusal to act ... unjustified.
The equitable authority to confer standing to nontrustees, the Newcorn court noted,
is generally derived from section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code. 364 However, the
Newcorn court also examined the reasoning of courts that had refused "to grant
standing, derivative or otherwise, to interested parties when the plain language of
the statute grants a right of action to only the trustee," and, interestingly, the court
365
cited a pre-HartfordUnderwritersbankruptcy decision as an example thereof.
The case cited, Surf N Sun Apts., Inc. v. Dempsey,366 relies on a 1988 Supreme
Court decision, which indicates that the equitable powers of the bankruptcy court
"must and can only be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code."' 367
Using language that presaged Hartford Underwriters,the Sun N Surf court concluded "that when Congress clearly and plainly grants the power to act to the trustee
under a section of the Code, the limitation of equity power expressed in Norwest
Bank precludes a bankruptcy court from granting derivative standing to any other
368
party"
The Newcorn court found that, when read together, Hartford Underwriters
and Norwest Bank "suggest" that a plain language interpretation of the Bankruptcy
Code should control: that when Congress clearly conveys a grant of authority to
the trustee, only the trustee may exercise that authority and that it is beyond the
scope of the equitable powers of the bankruptcy court, in these circumstances, to
grant derivative standing to a nontrustee. 369 However, two considerations compelled the Missouri bankruptcy court to reject the suggestion: first, the Eighth
Circuit had already endorsed derivative creditor standing in Nangle v. Lauer 370
and second, the Supreme Court had "side-stepped" the issue in footnote five of
HartfordUnderwriters.37 1 The Newcorn court argued that the Nangle court must
have "concluded that Norwest Bank did not curtail a bankruptcy courts' equitable
power to grant derivative standing when a trustee unreasonably fails to act" even
though no such analysis was set forth in the Nangle opinion.372 Accordingly,
362. Id.

363. Id. The court cited to Gibson as support for the validity of this rule. Id.
364. Id. See also 11 U.S.C. § 105 (2000); supra note 318.
365. In re Newcorn Enters., Ltd., 287 B.R. at 748.
366. 253 B.R. 490 (M.D. Fla. 1999).

367. In re Newcorn Enters., Ltd., 287 B.R. at 748 (quoting Norwest Bank Worthington v.
Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988)) (emphasis added). SurfN Sun Apts., Inc. arose under section
503(b)(3)(B). Id.
368. Id. at 749.
369. Id.
370. 98 F.3d 378, 388 (8th Cir. 1996). InNangle,the court refused to allow creditors to bring
a preferential transfer action because they offered no evidence that the trustee was "unable or
unwilling" to pursue the claims himself. Id. The reverse implication of this decision is that if
the creditors had presented such evidence they would have been allowed to proceed. See id.
371. In re Newcorn Enters., Ltd., 287 B.R. at 749.
372. Id.
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despite "find[ing] that the two Supreme Court cases.., create a reasonable argument to deny derivative standing," the court followed Nangle.373 The court granted
the Committee the authority to pursue the claims because they were colorable and
374
would, if successful, benefit the estate as a whole.
B. The Second Circuit
One month after the Third Circuit issued Cybergenics II, the Second Circuit
handed down Housecraft.375 Housecraft was a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding
in which the trustee and the primary secured creditor of the debtor were jointly
prosecuting fraudulent transfer claims to recover property transferred by the debtor
both before and after filing bankruptcy. 376 The defendant, Federal Plastics Manufacturing, moved to dismiss the creditor, Banque Nationale de Paris ("BNP"), from
the proceeding for lack of standing. 377 Federal Plastics raised the argument that
sections 548 and 549 of the Bankruptcy Code contain express authorizations for
the trustee or debtor-in-possession, and only that party, to bring avoidance actions
and, therefore, BNP had no statutory authority to be a party to the suit.37 8 Although this argument appears to rely on Hartford Underwriters,the Second Circuit opinion makes no reference to either that Supreme Court case or to Cybergenics
11.379
The bankruptcy court recognized that the Housecraft estate did not have the
funds to pursue this claim on its own. 380 Because the potential recovery of the
fraudulent transfer claims was sizable, the bankruptcy court found that it was in
the best interests of the estate to ratify an agreement between BNP and the trustee
to prosecute the claims jointly.381 The district court agreed, relying on Second
Circuit precedent in order to find that BNP had standing because it was in the
estate's best interests: "'because the suit presents colorable claims for relief; because [the trustee] would have failed to pursue the suit without the assistance of
BNP; and because there is no net financial burden on the bankruptcy estate, BNP is
382
entitled to standing.'
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's reasoning, expressly stating
that "[a]lthough not explicitly authorized by the Code, we have extended standing
...under [sections] 548 and 549 to additional parties such as creditors when to do
so is in the best interest of the estate."383 The court restated its position that credi373. Id. at 749-50.
374. Id. at 750.
375. 310 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2002).
376. Id. at 65-66.
377. Id. at 66.
378. Id. at 67.
379. See generally Housecraft, 310 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2002).
380. Id. at 68 n.4.
381. Id. at 68. The agreement between BNP and the trustee provided that BNP would put up
the funds necessary to prosecute that claim. Id. It stipulated that if there was any recovery from
the litigation, funds would be as follows: "(1) litigation costs and attorney's fees to BNP, (2)
$15,000 to Housecraft's estate, and (3) the balance to be split, 80% for BNP and 20% for the
estate." Id. at 67.
382. Id. at 68 (quoting Glinka v. Abraham & Rose Co., 199 B.R. 484, 494) (Bankr. D. Vt.
1996)).
383. Id. at 70.
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tors may bring adversary proceedings when a trustee or debtor-in-possession unjustifiably refuses to bring suit, or when the creditor(s) have: (1) consent from the
trustee or debtor-in-possession; (2) the suit is in the estate's best interest; and (3)
the suit is "necessary and beneficial" to the efficient resolution of the bankruptcy
case. 384 The Housecraftcourt found that these criteria were satisfied: the trustee
had given consent; without BNP's help the trustee could not have pursued the
claim or any part thereof; and, it substantially reduced the likelihood of any future
litigation between BNP and the estate regarding BNP's security interest in the
385
transferred property.
Federal Plastics also argued that the court's holding in Commodore regarding
386
creditor derivative standing should not be extended to secured creditors, like BNp.
Secured creditors, it asserted, could be distinguished from unsecured creditors by
the fact that unsecured creditors and the trustee or debtor-in-possession have a
common interest in the value of the estate. 3 87 In contrast, the secured creditor's
interest is virtually certain to conflict because a valid security interest will devalue
the estate. 388 The court rejected this argument, finding that the interests of the
estate were still protected. 389 First, the trustee could withhold consent to the creditor,
secured or unsecured, to pursue claims when he or she determines that the "creditor's
interests are adverse to those of the estate."' 390 Second, the bankruptcy court must
make an independent determination that the creditor's interests are not adverse to
the estate. 391 Further, the court noted, if BNP had not been allowed standing to
jointly prosecute the claim, Federal Plastics would have "succeeded in evading the
' 392
bankruptcy laws and benefiting financially at the expense of Housecraft's estate."
A few months later, a Connecticut bankruptcy court cited Housecraft in support of its holding that an unsecured creditors' committee had derivative standing
to pursue an avoidance action on behalf of a Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession in In
re Stanwich FinancialServices.393 In this case, the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors was, pursuant to a court approved stipulation with the debtor, pros394
ecuting avoidance claims in order to set aside prepetition transfers of stock.
The defendants, Jonathon Pardee and Ogden Sutro, argued that the plain language
of the Bankruptcy Code in section 544(b) authorized only a trustee or debtor-inpossession to commence or prosecute avoidance actions. 395 However, the court
refused to "blindly" extend the textual interpretation of one section of the Bank384. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
385. Id. at 72. BNP had a security interest in the property that had been transferred. Id. at 67.
The property, Nutribar containers, had been sold so the sole recovery available to BNP pursuant
to its security interest was the possible recovery of a money judgment. Id. at 68.
386. Id. at 72.
387. Id.
388. See id.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id. at 71.
393. 288 B.R. 24, 27 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2002).
394. Id. at 25.
395. Id. at 25-26.
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396

ruptcy Code to another.
Looking at the express language in footnote five of the
Hartford Underwritersopinion, which declined to address the validity of the practice at issue, the Connecticut bankruptcy court refused to find the Supreme Court's
analysis of the language "the trustee may" in section 506 controlling in a case
arising under section 544(b). 397 Instead, the Stanwich court found that Second
Circuit precedent, which respected "the equitable balance struck by a holistic reading
of the Bankruptcy Code," was controlling. 398 The court found that "the core objectives of bankruptcy" would not be realized if recipients of pre- or post-petition
estate property could be insulated from avoidance actions and, accordingly, it granted
the Creditors' Committee "standing to commence and prosecute the instant adver' 399
sary proceeding on behalf of the bankruptcy estate."
C. The Ninth Circuit
In 2002, a California bankruptcy court examined the Second Circuit's "rule,"
as it tried to discern whether, and under what circumstances, a court may, notwithstanding Hartford Underwriters,"authorize a party other than the trustee to act on
the trustee's behalf."400 In In re Smith, the plaintiff, Bank One, a secured creditor
of the debtor, asked the bankruptcy court to grant it the authority to commence a
derivative surcharge action under section 506(c), the same provision of the Code
at issue in Hartford Underwriters.40 1 Bank One tried to distinguish its case by
arguing that the Supreme Court had "expressly left open the question whether a
bankruptcy court could 'allow other interested parties to act in the trustee's stead
in pursuing recovery under [section] 506(c).' 402 Ultimately, the California court
396. Id. The Stanwich court cited to principles of statutory construction as set forth in Supreme Court cases other than Hartford Underwriters: "[s]tatutory construction is a holistic
endeavor... the meaning of one provision is clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme
when only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with
the rest of the law." Id. at 26 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Cleveland Indian
Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 217 (2001) (quoting United States Savings Assn. v. Timbers of
Inwood, 484 U.S. 365 (1998))).
397. Id. at 26.
398. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Pardee (In re Stanwich Fin. Servs.), 288 B.R.
at 26.
399. Id. at 27. The Stanwich court also relied on a Ninth Circuit case, which in turn had relied
on Second Circuit precedent, to support its holding:
a flat prohibition against any surrogate representation ... not only conflicts with
accepted practice, it also fails to recognize the potential benefits of allowing an unsecured creditors' committee to conduct estate litigation. The [debtor-in-possession]
has an obligation to pursue all actions that are in the best interests of creditors and the
estate .... An unsecured creditors' committee has a close identity of interests with
the [debtor-in-possession] in this regard .... Rather than a flat prohibition, impartial
judicial balancing of the benefits of a committee's representation better serves the
bankruptcy estate. So long as the bankruptcy court exercises its judicial oversight
and verifies that the litigation is indeed necessary and beneficial, allowing a creditors'
committee to represent the estate produces no undue concerns.
Id. (quoting Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Official Unsecured Creditors' Comm. of Spaulding Composites Co., 207 B.R. 899, 904 (B.A.P 9th Cit. 1997) (alterations in original) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
400. In re Smith Bros. Motors, Inc., 286 B.R. 905, 908 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2002).
401. Id. at 906.
402. Id. at 908 (quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1,
13 n.5 (2000)).
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chose not to reach the issue, finding that even if it did have the authority to "confer
derivative standing on a party to assert the trustee's rights under [section] 506(c).
. this is not an appropriate case for the court to do so. ' 403 The court reasoned
that, if the trustee reasonably-and not in violation of his fiduciary duties to the
estate-refused to allow a creditor to act in his stead, then a court should defer to
that decision. 404 In this case, the court found that the trustee was acting reason40 5
ably because the section 506(c) surcharge claim was not colorable.
40 6
The court never concluded whether derivative creditor standing is valid.
However, interestingly, the court endeavored to establish a Code "hierarchy" as to
when derivative standing was "more likely" to be valid. 407 The more likely a
provision was to benefit the estate as a whole rather than a particular claimant, the
more likely a court had the authority to authorize derivative standing. 408 Since
avoidance actions were more likely to benefit the estate than administrative surcharge claims, the court speculated that derivative standing might be valid under
the former but not under the latter.409
The Smith court's speculation calls attention to the irregular and unsettled
form of judicially conferred derivative standing. The concept of derivative standing rests upon the notion that the judiciary may extend express, and otherwise
exclusive, powers to "non-grantees" whenever it deems that act to be necessary or
beneficial to a bankruptcy estate. It may be appropriate in one circumstance but
not another; it may be appropriate for use under one provision but not another; it
may be appropriate for use under one provision under peculiar circumstances but
only in limited effect. The decisions that adopt derivative standing purport to set
forth rules defining and limiting the concept. However, these rules are, in effect,
policy judgments about the role non-trustees should play in bankruptcy proceedings. Until Cybergenics 11, courts generally issued these "best interests of the
estate" policy judgments as a matter of course.
VII. CONCLUSION
Shortly before Cybergenics II was issued the American Bankruptcy Journal
noted:
Although the Bankruptcy Code is silent with respect to the right of a creditors'
committee to file an adversary proceeding, almost all of the courts that have
considered this issue have been unanimous in recognizing that such a right exists. However, most courts have required that the committee obtain prior court
approval as a condition precedent to the initiation of suit. A debtor may have a
number of valid reasons why it believes that a suit should not be instituted, particularly within the context of a reorganization. These reasons, however, must be
balanced against the creditors' interests in recovering property of the estate, which
implies that the committee must establish some "benefit to the estate" in pursuing the claims. Assuming bankruptcy court approval, there have been few chal4 10
lenges to the committee's institution of suit.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
INST. J.,

Id.
Id.
Id. at 909-10.
See generally id.
See generally id.
See id. at 908.
Id.
Lawrence K. Snider, Recent Decisions Regarding Creditors' Committees, AM. BANKR.
22 at 22 (March 2002).
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However, such a challenge has now clearly been raised to the forefront of bankruptcy law discussion. The threatened abrogation of the practice has already started
to have a profound effect on bankruptcy proceedings in the Third Circuit and could,
ultimately, alter a bankruptcy practice that has roots over one hundred years old.
Those who insist that the practice is vital and necessary in order for the overarching
policies of bankruptcy to be achieved try to substantiate their position with a range
of theories regarding the appropriateness of "equitable" Bankruptcy Code construction.
As the Newcorn court speculated, equitable Code construction and derivative
creditor standing are no longer tenable under the present Court without Congressional action. Hartford Underwritersand Norwest Bank suggest that a bankruptcy
court must construe the Bankruptcy Code literally and that it may not use its equitable powers to confer authority upon parties to act when such action is outside the
express constraints of the Code. The "best interests of the estate" logic employed
by decisions such as Housecraft cannot survive Hartford Underwritersbecause
courts may not pursue the best interests of the estate by side-stepping the plain
meaning of express Code provisions.
There are no Bankruptcy Code provisions that clearly and literally convey the
power to initiate suit, in the name of the trustee, to nontrustees. Section 503 might
imply that such a right exists, but the right itself is nowhere to be found in the
text. 4 11 It is unlikely that a court espousing "plain meaning" Bankruptcy Code
construction, such as the current Supreme Court, will substantiate the validity of
an "implied" right through a patchwork of Code provisions, when it can find no
express language to support it. Furthermore, the section 503 argument is only
persuasive if the Court finds that it raises enough of an ambiguity regarding derivative creditor standing that statutory interpretation requires the Court to supplement its understanding of the language with established pre-Code practice. In
HartfordUnderwriters,the Supreme Court indicated there would be an exceptionally heavy burden of persuasion in convincing the Court that "clarification" of
Code language by pre-Code practice is warranted. 4 12 It is unlikely that the ambiguity regarding section 503, especially as it is undercut by Judge Fuentes' dissent
in Cybergencis III, will meet this heavy burden.413
Under current Supreme Court precedent and extant Bankruptcy Code language,
Cybergenics 11 was rightly decided. The Third Circuit panel had the option of
"side-stepping" the issue, like many other courts, and maintaining the status quo.
Nonetheless, the Cybergenics II court chose to reach the issue and to assess the
validity of derivative avoidance actions pursuant to a "plain meaning" analysis of
the Bankruptcy Code. The court correctly concluded that, absent plain and unambiguous legislative reform, this type of derivative standing is no longer tenable.
Given the intricacies of bankruptcy practice and the widely disparate circumstances
of each bankruptcy estate, lawmakers should amend the Bankruptcy Code and
memorialize the authority of bankruptcy courts to extend the trustee's express pow411. See 11 U.S.C. § 503 (2000).
412. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v.Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1, 9 (2000).
413. See supra note 120, at 586. Judge Fuentes further argued that, even if the court were to
look at pre-Code practice, they would "find only four or five [cases] that recognize derivative
action by creditors' committees." Cybergenics 111, 330 F3d 548, 586 n.4 (3d Cir. 2003) (Fuentes,
J., dissenting).

200,4]

CYBERGENICS II

ers to a non-trustee when it is in the best interests of the estate to do so. In light of

Norwest and HartfordUnderwriters,Congress's broad grant of equitable authority
in section 105 is insufficient. Bankruptcy practice may have reached "a point at
which the most orthodox legal proposition, if not tied to a specific Code section,
4 14
may actually be challenged as spurious.",

Nancy Hailer

414. Textualism, supra note 2, at 8 (quoting Andrew Kull, Restitution in Bankruptcy: Reclamation and Constructive Trust, 72 AM. BANKt.L. J. 265, 266-67 (1998)). Professor Kull noted
that codification of general background common law can lead to a phenomenon of its ultimate
obscuring:
Unlike the comprehensive framework of a continental legal code, the Uniform Commercial Code and the Bankruptcy Code were drafted as common-law statutes. In
theory, at least, they displace the preexisting common law only to the extent they alter
it, and they presume the continued existence of this background law to govern every
question not otherwise resolved. In practice it does not work quite like that. Lawyers
and judges who deal regularly with commercial materials come to expect that any
problem worth arguing about has been made the subject of an express statutory provision, their usual task being to locate and explicate the relevant statutory language. In
consequence, the neglected background law recedes still further ....

